It should be 100% obvious that there will soon be mythos level models on cyber security that are open and available to anyone. As a byproduct of this, alternative tech stacks will emerge that also drive more economic value and control away from the US’s tech stack. This is what should be considered when thinking through the gate keeping you want to have in AI. If advanced models will become open and available regardless, then by not allowing the release of models you’re neither more secure nor better off strategically. So much of the regulatory approach to AI has to assume China can’t catch up, when all current evidence suggests they can and are. And further, hard to imagine a higher priority than winning in AI for China; so you’re basically betting against their long term ingenuity, talent and motivation. Seems like a bad bet. So your options are either to create gates around your best models, which means you’re asymmetrically disadvantaging yourself, or you work to ensure you’re always at the frontier and driving the future architectures of AI.
很显然，很快就会出现达到 mythos 级别、聚焦 cyber security 的 models，而且它们将是 open、任何人都可以使用的。作为这一点的副产品，还会涌现出 alternative tech stacks，它们也会把更多经济价值和控制权从 US 的 tech stack 中转移出去。这才是在思考你希望在 AI 中设置哪些 gate keeping（准入限制）时应该考虑的问题。如果 advanced models 无论如何都会变得 open 且可获得，那么不允许发布 models 并不会让你更安全，也不会让你在战略上处于更有利的位置。当前针对 AI 的许多监管思路，都必须建立在 China 追不上来的假设上；但现有的所有证据都表明，他们不仅能追上，而且正在追上。更进一步说，很难想象对 China 而言还有什么比赢得 AI 更高的优先级；所以你基本上是在赌他们长期的创造力、人才和动力不会兑现。这看起来是个糟糕的赌注。所以你的选择，要么是围绕你最好的 models 设立门槛，而这意味着你在不对称地让自己处于劣势；要么就是努力确保自己始终站在 frontier（前沿），并主导 AI 的未来 architectures（架构）。