Speaker 100:00 - 00:05
Welcome to War two fifty, first advanced reactor to ever make power by startup. Speaker 100:00 - 00:05
欢迎来到 War two fifty,这是首个在 startup(启动)过程中就实现发电的先进反应堆。
Speaker 200:06 - 00:15
We did something pretty awesome today. The first ever AI chip powered by a nuclear reactor. First Triso reactor to turn on in over fifty years in The United States. Speaker 200:06 - 00:15
我们今天做成了一件非常了不起的事:首个由核反应堆供电的 AI chip(芯片)。这也是五十多年来 The United States 首次点亮 Triso reactor。
Speaker 300:15 - 00:26
How much of the premise of Valor is possible now comes from increasing demands for power in The United States largely driven by AI compute? Speaker 300:15 - 00:26
Valor 这个前提如今有多大程度上之所以成为可能,是因为 The United States 对电力的需求不断上升,而这在很大程度上是由 AI compute(算力)驱动的?
Speaker 200:26 - 00:46
Energy being a commodity, the demand is set by the price. If you can figure out how to make energy cheaper, you will have demand. When SpaceX started going, people were like, there's no way they're gonna hit the numbers that they're hitting today. Most of the nuclear industry is a modeling and simulation industry. They're not focused on hardware iteration, hardware execution, building the simplest and safest reactor that allows them to scale. Speaker 200:26 - 00:46
由于能源是一种 commodity(大宗商品),需求是由价格决定的。如果你能想办法把能源做得更便宜,就会有需求。SpaceX 刚开始做的时候,人们会说,他们绝不可能达到今天这样的数字。核工业的大部分其实是一个 modeling and simulation(建模与仿真)行业。他们并不专注于 hardware iteration(硬件迭代)、hardware execution(硬件执行),也不专注于建造那种既最简单又最安全、并且能让他们实现 scale(规模化)的反应堆。
Speaker 200:46 - 00:49
And Valor just demonstrated that we are. Speaker 200:46 - 00:49
而 Valor 刚刚证明了,我们就是这样做的。
Speaker 300:55 - 01:23
Hi, listeners. Welcome back to No Priors. Today, I'm here with Isaiah Taylor, the founder and CEO of Valor Atomics. We're here in their Utah nuclear facility, where we're gonna do a tour, talk about why speed and scale are the only path to making nuclear reactors in The United States again, why energy is the only input to our hyper techno industrial future, and why there's an open regulatory environment for progress in energy R and D for the first time in years. Welcome. Speaker 300:55 - 01:23
嗨,听众朋友们,欢迎回到 No Priors。今天和我一起的是 Isaiah Taylor,他是 Valor Atomics 的 founder and CEO(创始人兼 CEO)。我们现在就在他们位于 Utah 的核设施里,接下来我们会参观一下,并聊聊为什么速度和规模是在 The United States 再次制造核反应堆的唯一道路,为什么能源是我们这个高度 techno-industrial(技术工业化)未来的唯一投入要素,以及为什么多年来我们第一次迎来了一个对能源 R and D(研发)进展持开放态度的监管环境。欢迎你。
Speaker 301:23 - 01:25
Isaiah, thanks so much for doing this. Speaker 301:23 - 01:25
Isaiah,非常感谢你接受这次采访。
Speaker 201:25 - 01:28
Of course. Welcome to Valor Atomics at San Rafael. Thanks for coming. Speaker 201:25 - 01:28
当然。欢迎来到位于 San Rafael 的 Valor Atomics。感谢你们过来。
Speaker 301:28 - 01:31
So what is what are you doing here at Valor? Speaker 301:28 - 01:31
所以,你在 Valor 这里是在做什么?
Speaker 201:31 - 01:49
We are making nuclear reactors built for planetary scale. So nuclear fission is kind of an old technology. It's around the nineteen forties that we really started working on it. And we've built a lot of nuclear reactors, but we've never built them for mass scale. Nuclear has never had its Ford moment or its Tesla moment, if you wanna put it that way. Speaker 201:31 - 01:49
我们在制造面向 planetary scale(行星级规模)的 nuclear reactors(核反应堆)。所以,nuclear fission(核裂变)算是一项比较老的技术了。大概从 1940 年代开始,我们才真正开始推进它。我们已经建了很多 nuclear reactors,但从来没有为大规模量产而建造它们。换句话说,nuclear 从来没有迎来过它的 Ford 时刻,或者它的 Tesla 时刻。
Speaker 201:49 - 02:05
And that's what Valor Atomics is working on doing. We have nuclear reactors that are more manufactured than constructed, and, they're extremely safe. And we think the combination of these two things is going to allow us to scale nuclear fission and make energy 10 times cheaper for humanity. So that's what we're working on. Speaker 201:49 - 02:05
而这正是 Valor Atomics 正在努力实现的事。我们的 nuclear reactors 更像是被制造出来的,而不是在现场施工建造出来的;而且它们极其安全。我们认为,这两点结合起来,将使我们能够扩大 nuclear fission 的规模,并让全人类的能源成本降低 10 倍。这就是我们正在做的事。
Speaker 302:05 - 02:26
We're gonna dig into why you think this is possible and why you're making it happen after decades of like no real activity in this space. But first, for you personally, you don't have the, you know, credentialed decades of nuclear research background that is often required to work in this space. Like, you know, why you and what triggered it? Speaker 302:05 - 02:26
我们接下来会深入聊聊,为什么你认为这件事可行,以及为什么在这个领域几十年几乎没有真正进展之后,你却在推动它发生。不过先说你个人:你并没有那种通常被认为进入这个领域所必需的、经过正式认证的数十年核研究背景。那为什么是你?又是什么触发了这件事?
Speaker 202:26 - 02:58
I have been reluctant to start this company for a long time and eventually did out of sheer frustration that, nobody else was was working on it with the pace required and understanding the scale that would be required. And, you know, I think any problem that, you want to work on that's that's as hard as this, you have to really, really believe in it. And after a certain amount of time, I just realized that I was never gonna stop thinking about this, and so I I might as well build it. It started for me. My great grandfather was a nuclear physicist on the Manhattan Project. Speaker 202:26 - 02:58
很长一段时间里,我其实都不太愿意创办这家公司,最后真正去做,纯粹是出于挫败感——因为没有其他人在以这个问题所要求的速度推进,也没有真正理解它所需要的规模。而且,我觉得任何你想去做、并且像这件事一样困难的问题,你都必须对它有非常、非常强的信念。过了一段时间之后,我只是意识到,我永远都不会停止思考这件事,所以我不如亲自把它做出来。对我来说,这件事的起点是:我的曾祖父是 Manhattan Project 的 nuclear physicist(核物理学家)。
Speaker 202:58 - 03:30
My great grandfather and great grandmother were both in the secret city during World War two, and I just grew up thinking about nuclear as this incredible technology. I've I've always wanted to build thousands of machines. I didn't know which ones I was gonna build. It was just very clear to me since I was, six that I was supposed to build thousands of machines. And at some point, I I went from thinking about nuclear as, like, a totally solved problem, right, which was my first, you know, outside view of the industry. Speaker 202:58 - 03:30
我的曾祖父和曾祖母在 World War two 期间都在那座 secret city(秘密城市)里,我从小就是带着一种想法长大的:nuclear 是一项不可思议的技术。我一直都想建造成千上万台机器。我不知道自己具体会造什么机器,但从我六岁起,有一点对我来说就非常清楚——我这一生就是要建造成千上万台机器。后来在某个阶段,我对 nuclear 的看法发生了变化:一开始,我觉得它像是一个已经被完全解决的问题,对吧,这算是我最初从行业外部看这个行业时的印象。
Speaker 203:30 - 03:46
Was like, okay. People know how to build reactors. They're doing fine at it. To suddenly realizing that this was an entirely unsolved problem that we we sort of thought we solved in the sixties, and there was, like, a good run into the seventies, and then we suddenly stopped. So I came to that realization. Speaker 203:30 - 03:46
当时我的想法是,好吧,人们知道怎么建 reactors,而且他们做得也不错。后来我突然意识到,这其实是一个完全没有被解决的问题;我们只是在 1960 年代以为自己解决了它,70 年代也算有过一段不错的发展势头,然后我们却突然停下来了。于是我得出了这个认识。
Speaker 203:46 - 03:56
It was very disorienting for me, actually. I I suddenly realized it. I actually remember the afternoon when I like, wait a minute. Did we actually stop building reactors in the seventies? Like, who why did nobody tell me that? Speaker 203:46 - 03:56
这件事其实让我非常失衡、非常迷惑。我是某一刻突然意识到的。我甚至还记得那天下午,我心想,等等——我们真的在 70 年代就停止建造 reactors 了吗?为什么从来没有人告诉我这件事?
Speaker 203:58 - 04:23
And really since that moment, I had been, like, obsessively trying to understand why. And I I came to some conclusions about why when I was in high school, and I I still hold those conclusions today. And then it was a, you know, ten year journey of, like, waiting for someone to solve the problem, watching every nuclear startup that popped up trying to figure out if they were gonna solve the problem, and eventually realizing that that no one was gonna solve it at the pace and scale that was necessary. And so I started Valor. Speaker 203:58 - 04:23
其实从那一刻起,我就一直近乎着魔地想弄明白为什么。我在高中时得出了一些关于原因的结论,而且直到今天我仍然认同这些结论。然后接下来就是一段大概十年的历程:一边等着别人来解决这个问题,一边关注每一家冒出来的 nuclear startup,想看他们能不能把问题解决掉,最后意识到,根本不会有人以真正必要的速度和规模来解决它。所以我创办了 Valor。
Speaker 304:23 - 04:29
So for people who come from outside the nuclear industry, like, why did we stop building reactors in this country? Speaker 304:23 - 04:29
所以,对那些并非来自 nuclear 行业的人来说,为什么我们这个国家后来不再建设 reactors 了?
Speaker 204:29 - 04:46
Yeah. We stopped for a pretty simple reason, which is 3 Mile Island. So we were building a lot of reactors. We were doing really well. We had a a nuclear incident in the 3 Mile 3 Mile Island reactor, and in that incident, we essentially lost the ability to cool the reactor. Speaker 204:29 - 04:46
对,原因其实很简单,就是 3 Mile Island。当时我们在建很多 reactors,进展也非常顺利。后来 3 Mile Island reactor 发生了一次 nuclear incident,在那次事件中,我们本质上失去了给 reactor 冷却的能力。
Speaker 204:46 - 05:02
And in traditional light water reactors, you have to always be able to cool them. Right? So if you shut a reactor down in in traditional nuclear, you have to keep cooling it even after shutdown. And in this case, the cooling system failed, and so you had core meltdown. Now nobody died. Speaker 204:46 - 05:02
而在传统的 light water reactors 里,你必须始终能够给它们冷却,对吧?所以在传统 nuclear 体系中,即使把 reactor 停掉,停堆之后你仍然要持续冷却它。而这一次,冷却系统失效了,于是就发生了 core meltdown。不过没有人死亡。
Speaker 205:02 - 05:42
Right? In fact, not only did nobody die, nobody was injured, and there was no radiation dose to the public, but it was sort of a optics and PR situation that was mismanaged in many, many different ways, and the public became fearful and and lost interest in nuclear. Now I think that actually turned around even, like, fifteen, twenty years ago where suddenly people looked back on that, and they said, okay, actually, we do know how to build reactors really safe. Even learnings from that we've taken and incorporated into new designs. But then there was a second problem, which was once you stop an industry, it's very hard to start it again. Speaker 205:02 - 05:42
对吧?事实上,不只是没有人死亡,也没有人受伤,公众也没有受到 radiation dose(辐射剂量),但这在某种程度上变成了一个 optics 和 PR 层面的事件,而且在很多很多方面都处理失当,于是公众开始害怕 nuclear,也失去了对它的兴趣。不过我认为,实际上这种情况甚至在十五二十年前就已经开始扭转了。人们突然回头看这件事,说,好吧,其实我们确实知道怎么把 reactors 建得非常安全。我们甚至还吸取了其中的经验教训,并把它们纳入了新设计之中。但随后又出现了第二个问题:一旦你让一个行业停下来,就很难再把它重新启动。
Speaker 205:43 - 06:02
And in the intervening time between 3 Mile Island and when people gained interest in nuclear again, we also really changed how we built things in The United States. We went from a country that was very good at large scale civil infrastructure. Right? Bridges, roads, huge power plants, dams, highway systems. Right? Speaker 205:43 - 06:02
而在从 3 Mile Island 到人们重新对 nuclear 产生兴趣之间的这段时间里,我们在 The United States 建造事物的方式也发生了很大变化。我们从一个非常擅长大型 civil infrastructure 的国家,变成了另一个样子。对吧?桥梁、道路、超大型 power plants、dams、highway systems,对吧?
Speaker 206:02 - 06:39
We were really good at large scale civil infrastructure. And we kind of atrophied at that skill set, and we got much better at advanced manufacturing. And so my realization, one of the first realizations I had about this was if you're going to reboot nuclear and you're actually believe in in the atomic energy century, which I absolutely do, it's probably not going to look like what it did in the sixties. It's not gonna look like civil infrastructure because we're not that good at that anymore, and what we're way better at is producing, you know, more complicated and more functional pieces of manufactured equipment. And so you're gonna shift from the civil infrastructure way of building to a manufacturing way of building. Speaker 206:02 - 06:39
我们当时非常擅长大型 civil infrastructure。但后来这套技能有些萎缩了,而我们在 advanced manufacturing 方面变得强得多。所以我对此最早形成的一个认识是:如果你要重启 nuclear,而且你真的相信 in the atomic energy century——而我绝对相信——那它大概不会再长得像六十年代那样。它不会是 civil infrastructure 那种样子,因为我们现在已经不再那么擅长那个了;而我们真正更擅长的,是生产那些更复杂、功能性更强的 manufactured equipment。所以,建造方式将会从 civil infrastructure 模式转向 manufacturing 模式。
Speaker 206:39 - 07:07
And I think even though some people did realize that, and this is generally what you'd call SMRs, right, small modular reactors, what was missing is that people did not realize that you're gonna have to pursue that model through hardware iteration. And that's where really where Valor is unique is that, yes, we believe in SMRs. We believe in reactors that are manufactured, but we also know that in order to get there, you have to do it through harder iteration. You have to turn some plants on. You have to turn on a 100 kilowatt reactor like the one behind us. Speaker 206:39 - 07:07
我认为,尽管有些人确实意识到了这一点——这通常就是你所说的 SMRs,也就是 small modular reactors——但缺失的一点在于,人们没有意识到,你必须通过 hardware iteration 来推进这种模式。而这也正是 Valor 真正独特的地方:没错,我们相信 SMRs,我们相信可制造出来的 reactors,但我们也知道,要走到那一步,你必须通过更艰难的 iteration。你必须让一些 plants 先运行起来。你必须先把一个 100 kilowatt reactor 点起来,比如我们身后这个。
Speaker 207:07 - 07:17
You have to go cold critical like we did in project Nova, and then you have to take the next steps after that. And it's gonna be driven by hardware iteration, and I think that's what nobody else realized before us. Speaker 207:07 - 07:17
你必须像我们在 project Nova 里那样进入 cold critical(冷临界)状态,然后再继续后面的步骤。而这一切将由 hardware iteration(硬件迭代)来驱动,我认为这正是除了我们之外没人意识到的事。
Speaker 307:17 - 07:34
So that's a whole company philosophy for you, but it has to interact with a regulatory environment where I think the assumed status quo is you can't iterate because you can't turn anything on, but it's gonna take you fifteen years to go to a permitting process and several billion dollars to get a no or try again. Speaker 307:17 - 07:34
所以,这其实是你的一整套公司哲学,但它又必须和监管环境发生互动;而我认为,默认的现状假设是:你没法迭代,因为你什么都不能启动;但与此同时,你却要花十五年走 permitting process(许可审批流程),再花上几十亿美元,最后得到一个“不行”或者“再试一次”的结果。
Speaker 207:34 - 07:34
Yes. Speaker 307:34 - 07:36
And so like why why isn't that true now? Speaker 307:34 - 07:36
那么,为什么现在情况不是这样了呢?
Speaker 207:36 - 07:50
There's this chicken and egg that existed for nuclear in the last twenty years where you need data in order to go to the regulator. But in order to go to the regulator with data, you have to have run a plant. Right? And so there's this, like, okay. How do you get the empirical data? Speaker 207:36 - 07:50
在过去二十年里,nuclear(核能)领域一直存在一个“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的问题:你需要有 data(数据)才能去找 regulator(监管机构)。但为了带着数据去找 regulator,你又必须先运行过一个 plant(工厂/核设施)。对吧?所以问题就在于:你到底怎么获得 empirical data(经验数据)?
Speaker 207:50 - 08:08
And the way that people tried to solve that was with modeling and simulation. Right? So if you look at the nuclear industry outside of Valor, it's mostly a modeling and simulation industry. Like, when you think of a nuclear company, right, there's, like, nuclear companies out there that everyone knows the name of, and you kinda look under the cover, it's actually a modeling and simulation company. Right? Speaker 207:50 - 08:08
而人们试图解决这个问题的方法,就是 modeling and simulation(建模与仿真)。对吧?所以如果你看看 Valor 之外的 nuclear industry(核工业),它基本上大多是一个 modeling and simulation industry(建模与仿真产业)。比如说,当你想到一家 nuclear company(核能公司)时,外面有一些大家都知道名字的 nuclear companies,但你稍微揭开表面一看,它实际上其实是一家 modeling and simulation company。对吧?
Speaker 208:08 - 08:34
They produce very, very precise what we call paper reactors, which have really good predictions of how a theoretical thing might behave. And that was sort of a hack to try to get around this regulatory chicken and egg. But the alternative is that you actually just do what congress originally intended. If you look back at the early days of nuclear legislation, there were actually two pathways for nuclear in The United States. There was the testing pathway and the commercial pathway. Speaker 208:08 - 08:34
他们产出的是非常、非常精确的、我们称之为 paper reactors(纸面反应堆)的东西;这些东西能够很好地预测某个理论上的系统可能会如何表现。这在某种程度上是一种 hack(权宜之计),试图绕开这种监管上的“鸡与蛋”问题。但另一种选择是,你真正去做 Congress 最初所设想的事。如果你回看早期的 nuclear legislation(核能立法),当时在 The United States,nuclear 实际上有两条路径:testing pathway(测试路径)和 commercial pathway(商业路径)。
Speaker 208:34 - 08:57
So the commercial pathway everyone knows is called the NRC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC is solving for large scale commercial deployment of mature systems. So, yeah, if you try to do the iteration under the regulator that's concerned with large scale commercial deployment of mature systems, that's gonna be tough. Right? You're you're gonna be asked commercial deployment questions when you're just trying to figure out how to bend some steel and get some atom splitting. Speaker 208:34 - 08:57
所以,大家都知道的 commercial pathway 叫作 NRC,也就是 Nuclear Regulatory Commission。NRC 要解决的是成熟系统的大规模商业部署问题。所以,没错,如果你试图在一个关注成熟系统大规模商业部署的 regulator 之下做 iteration(迭代),那会非常困难。对吧?当你只是想先搞清楚怎么把一些 steel(钢材)弯好、怎么把 atom splitting(原子裂变)真正做起来时,他们却会拿商业部署层面的问题来问你。
Speaker 208:58 - 09:31
But there's another pathway, and that pathway is the Department of Energy. So most people don't know this, but the Department of Energy was originally called the ERDA, the Energy Research and Development Agency. And people don't know that because it was only called the ERDA for about two years. There was a little two year period where it was it was renamed shortly after, But its origin is actually a spinout of the Atomic Energy Commission. So where the DOE comes from originally is Congress taking the Atomic Energy Commission, which was one agency responsible for both commercial deployment and for testing. Speaker 208:58 - 09:31
但还有另一条路径,那就是 Department of Energy。大多数人其实不知道,Department of Energy 最初叫 ERDA,也就是 Energy Research and Development Agency。人们不知道这一点,是因为它叫 ERDA 的时间只有大约两年。中间有一个很短的两年时期,之后它很快就改名了;但它的起源实际上是从 Atomic Energy Commission 分拆出来的。所以,DOE 最初的来源,其实是 Congress 把 Atomic Energy Commission——这个同时负责商业部署和测试的单一机构——拆分开来。
Speaker 209:31 - 09:51
And they said, actually, let's split these out. Let's make the NRC in charge of commercial deployment. Let's make the ERDA in charge of testing, and we'll have these two two separate agencies. And then two years later, congress said, actually, we're just gonna call the ERDA the Department of Energy, right, the DOE. But the origin of this agency is testing nuclear reactors. Speaker 209:31 - 09:51
他们当时说,实际上,我们把这些职能拆开吧。让 NRC 负责商业部署,让 ERDA 负责测试,这样我们就有了两个彼此独立的机构。然后两年后,Congress 又说,实际上,我们就把 ERDA 叫作 Department of Energy,也就是 DOE。但这个机构最初的起源,其实是测试 nuclear reactors(核反应堆)。
Speaker 209:51 - 10:15
That's what it's for. And everyone sort of forgot this. It's just been sitting there in legislation for, like, forty years, and no one's really taken advantage of it except for one government program here or there where they wanna, you know, do a NASA space reactor or something like that. But it has, from a legal perspective, been waiting for an administration to say, hey. This might be a a way to accelerate nuclear r and d. Speaker 209:51 - 10:15
这就是它的用途。只是大家某种程度上都把这件事忘了。它就这样在立法里放了大概四十年,几乎没人真正利用它,除了零星的一些 government program,偶尔想做个 NASA 的 space reactor 之类的项目。但从法律角度看,它一直在那里,等着某一届政府站出来说,嘿,这或许是一个加速 nuclear r and d 的办法。
Speaker 210:15 - 10:38
And that's exactly what the Trump administration has done. So the reactor that's behind us here was turned on under an executive order. It was EO14301, which called for three advanced reactors to go critical on American soil by July 4. And and we built it under Department of Energy, authority under that executive order. So, mean, this is an incredibly exciting time in nuclear. Speaker 210:15 - 10:38
而这正是 Trump administration 所做的事。所以我们身后这座 reactor,就是在一项 executive order 之下启动的。那是 EO14301,要求在 7 月 4 日之前让三座 advanced reactors 在 American soil 上达到 critical(临界)状态。我们也是依据这项 executive order 赋予 Department of Energy 的 authority 来建造它的。所以我的意思是,这对 nuclear 领域来说是一个令人无比兴奋的时刻。
Speaker 210:38 - 10:59
This is really breaking that chicken and egg. Right? It's the first time where we've been able to to shortcut that, you know, problem of how do you get data, and and we have data now. We're currently, as we're sitting here, making a 100 kilowatts, splitting something like 10 to the 17 atoms per second in this reactor behind us. So this is the control room. Speaker 210:38 - 10:59
这确实打破了那个 chicken and egg(先有鸡还是先有蛋)的困局。对吧?这是我们第一次能够绕开那个问题——你到底怎么获得数据——而现在我们已经有数据了。就在我们坐在这里的时候,我们目前正在发出 100 kilowatts 的功率,在我们身后这座 reactor 里每秒裂变大约 10 的 17 次方个 atoms。所以这里就是 control room。
Speaker 210:59 - 11:08
There's two sections. This is the control half. This door is closed. We have to have senior reactor operator's permission to enter here, which we just got. Thank you, Brent. Speaker 210:59 - 11:08
这里分成两个区域。这边是控制区。这扇门是关着的。要进入这里,我们必须得到 senior reactor operator 的许可,而我们刚刚已经拿到了。谢谢你,Brent。
Speaker 211:08 - 11:11
And out here is sort of our Speaker 211:08 - 11:11
而外面这边算是我们的
Speaker 111:11 - 11:12
observation room. Speaker 111:11 - 11:12
observation room。
Speaker 311:12 - 11:14
It looks like the control room in Hawthorne. Speaker 311:12 - 11:14
它看起来像 Hawthorne 的 control room。
Speaker 211:14 - 11:25
It's it is the exact control room in Hawthorne. We literally picked this up, put it on an airplane, flew it here. So the entirety of the plant, including a controller, flew with us on the c seventeens. First time that's ever been done, which is pretty cool. Speaker 211:14 - 11:25
这就是 Hawthorne 里的那个原封不动的控制室。我们真的是把它整个搬起来,放上飞机,直接飞到这里。所以整座工厂的完整系统,包括控制器,都跟着我们一起搭乘 C-17 飞过来了。这还是第一次有人这么干,确实挺酷的。
Speaker 311:25 - 11:27
How many people operate? Speaker 311:25 - 11:27
有多少人负责操作?
Speaker 411:27 - 11:46
We got one one operator at the controls who's the reactor operator who's controlling all of this. Then you've got a senior reactor operator who provides oversight and kind of ensures that we're staying within our safety limits and stuff. But we always have to have one person at the controls maintaining safety, maintaining the reactor. Speaker 411:27 - 11:46
我们有一名操作员坐在控制台前,也就是 reactor operator,由他来控制这一切。然后还有一名 senior reactor operator 负责监督,确保我们始终处在安全限值之内之类的。不过无论如何,我们都必须始终有一人守在控制台前,维护安全,维护 reactor。
Speaker 211:47 - 12:03
So in a couple of days here we're gonna do a scram. So we're gonna press that big red button right there. Big red button scrams the reactor so basically drops the rods, right? Dropping the control rods will introduce a lot of boron carbide into the core. When we scram that, rods will drop. Speaker 211:47 - 12:03
再过几天我们会在这里做一次 scram(紧急停堆)。到时候我们会按下那边那个大红按钮。那个大红按钮会让 reactor scram,也就是基本上把 rods 放下去,对吧?control rods 一旦落下,就会把大量 boron carbide 带入 core。我们执行 scram 时,rods 就会下落。
Speaker 212:03 - 12:26
Boron carbide enters the core. Boron is a strong neutron absorber, and so there will not be enough neutrons to maintain criticality because the neutron population gets absorbed into the into the rods. So that'll cause the reaction to stop. Now in a nuclear reactor, this is getting to the core of, like, what is Valor doing differently? Why do we really believe that the technology that we have here is gonna scale? Speaker 212:03 - 12:26
boron carbide 会进入 core。boron 是一种很强的 neutron absorber(中子吸收剂),所以将不会有足够的 neutrons 来维持 criticality(临界状态),因为 neutron population 会被 rods 吸收掉。这样反应就会停止。说到 nuclear reactor,这其实正好切中了一个核心问题:Valor 到底做了什么不一样的事?我们为什么真的相信手上的这项技术能够 scale(规模化扩展)?
Speaker 212:26 - 12:56
Traditionally, when you scram the reactor in a light water reactor, your work is nowhere near done yet. Right? The next really day of operations is incredibly important because when you turn the reactor off in a traditional nuclear reactor, you still have a lot of heat produced. And you have a lot of heat produced because in a nuclear core, you still have about 5%, heat production from recently split atoms. So when a reactor is running, you have a bunch of atoms being split. Speaker 212:26 - 12:56
按传统做法,在 light water reactor 里,当你让 reactor scram 之后,工作还远远没有结束,对吧?接下来差不多一天的操作都极其重要,因为在传统 nuclear reactor 里,即使你把 reactor 关掉了,仍然还会产生大量热量。之所以还有这么多热量,是因为在 nuclear core 里,最近刚发生裂变的 atoms 仍然会贡献大约 5% 的热产生。所以当 reactor 运行时,会有一大批 atoms 被裂变。
Speaker 212:56 - 13:11
They're producing a ton of energy. And even after the reaction shuts down, you you have recently split atoms that are continuing down their decay chains. Mhmm. So this is called decay heat. And decay heat's about five to 6% of what your continuous power was before you shut down. Speaker 212:56 - 13:11
它们会产生巨大的能量。即使反应已经停止,你仍然有那些最近发生裂变的 atoms 继续沿着它们的 decay chains(衰变链)往下衰变。嗯。所以这就叫 decay heat(衰变热)。而 decay heat 大约相当于你停机之前连续输出功率的 5% 到 6%。
Speaker 213:12 - 13:34
And in a traditional reactor, the the reactor would melt down if you wouldn't if you didn't continue to run the cooling pumps after turning the reactor off. So there's no more fission occurring. You don't have a a chain reaction anymore, but you do have this decay heat. And if you were to just sort of let it sit there, that heat would build up and you would have meltdown. That's exactly what happened in Fukushima and 3 Mile Island. Speaker 213:12 - 13:34
在传统 reactor 里,如果你在关停 reactor 之后不继续运行冷却泵,reactor 就会发生 meltdown(堆芯熔毁)。也就是说,已经没有新的 fission(裂变)在发生了,也不再有 chain reaction(链式反应),但 decay heat 仍然存在。如果你只是把它放在那里不管,热量就会不断积累,最终导致 meltdown。这正是 Fukushima 和 3 Mile Island 发生的情况。
Speaker 213:35 - 13:36
And so the way Speaker 213:35 - 13:36
所以,他们的做法是
Speaker 113:36 - 13:37
that they deal with this Speaker 113:36 - 13:37
他们处理这个问题的方式
Speaker 213:37 - 13:45
in traditional plants is they have very, very carefully built cooling systems that they continue to run for about twenty four hours after shutdown. Speaker 213:37 - 13:45
在传统核电站里,是建造非常非常精心设计的冷却系统,并且在停堆后继续运行大约二十四小时。
Speaker 113:47 - 13:48
And they try to build in Speaker 113:47 - 13:48
他们还会尽量加入
Speaker 213:48 - 14:05
all these redundancies and and make sure that in any circumstance, the cooling systems never ever ever fail. And that works pretty well. And nuclear is is the safest form of energy ever made. Even with sort of that caveat, 3 Mile Island, you know, even though it melted down, nobody died. Right? Speaker 213:48 - 14:05
所有这些冗余设计,并确保在任何情况下,冷却系统都绝对绝对绝对不会失效。而这一套做法效果相当不错。核能是人类有史以来最安全的能源形式。即便算上那个但书——3 Mile Island——你知道,虽然它发生了堆芯熔毁,但没有人死亡。对吧?
Speaker 214:05 - 14:24
Fukushima, arguably, maybe one person died. It's sort of a debate among scientists whether that person died from radiation or not. So even as traditional nuclear is, it's very safe, but we wanna do even better. And we wanna do better because we are interested in scale. We wanna make thousands of reactors, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands. Speaker 214:05 - 14:24
Fukushima,严格说来,也许只有一人死亡。那个人是否死于辐射,科学家之间至今还有争议。所以即使传统核能已经非常安全了,我们还是想做得更好。而我们之所以想做得更好,是因为我们关注的是规模化。我们想制造几千座反应堆、几万座、几十万座。
Speaker 214:25 - 14:38
And when you're doing that, you really just want it to never ever melt down for any reason. Right? And so the best way to do that is actually just to make active COE systems unnecessary altogether. And that's actually what we're going to demonstrate on Friday. We're going to scram this reactor. Speaker 214:25 - 14:38
当你要这么做的时候,你真的会希望它在任何情况下都永远永远不会熔毁。对吧?所以,最好的办法其实就是让主动式冷却系统彻底变得不再必要。而这也正是我们周五要演示的内容。我们会让这座反应堆 scram(紧急停堆)。
Speaker 214:38 - 14:54
Immediately after we scram, we're actually going to turn off the entire electrical supply to the plant. We're going to turn off the circulator. We're going to turn off the RCCS pump. Every safety system in this plant, we're gonna shut off, and we're gonna watch what happens. Now we have a cheat code. Speaker 214:38 - 14:54
在我们完成 scram 之后,我们实际上会立刻切断整个电站的全部供电。我们会关掉 circulator,会关掉 RCCS pump。这个电站里的每一套安全系统,我们都会关闭,然后看看会发生什么。现在,我们有一个 cheat code。
Speaker 214:54 - 15:11
We know what's gonna happen, because we did this in Hawthorne before we had, neutrons in it. We ran the the plant at full power with electrical simulators. We basically have these electrical resistors in the plant at Hawthorne. We put about 15 city blocks worth of LA power into this and got it up to full nuclear temperatures and pressures. Speaker 214:54 - 15:11
我们知道会发生什么,因为我们之前在 Hawthorne、在里面还没有 neutrons(中子)的时候,就已经做过这件事了。我们用 electrical simulators(电模拟器)让整座装置以满功率运行。基本上,我们在 Hawthorne 的装置里放了一些 electrical resistors(电阻器)。我们向其中输入了大约相当于 LA 15 个 city blocks 用电量的电力,把它加热到完整的 nuclear(核)温度和压力条件。
Speaker 315:11 - 15:12
Right. I remember seeing the sim. Speaker 315:11 - 15:12
对,我记得看过那个 sim(模拟)。
Speaker 215:12 - 15:52
Yeah. And so we we held it there, and then we did exactly what we're about to do, which is we turned off all safety systems at once, and we watched the plan for two days. And exactly what we had hoped happened, which is that the RCCS panels, which are these water jackets around the core, went into passive circulation mode, meaning the water boils, the steam leaves, it condenses, that removes heat, and you have natural circulation with no moving parts. So zero input from the operators, no moving parts in electrical control. It's just the geometry of that system that slowly just removes that decay heat over a period of two days. Speaker 215:12 - 15:52
对。然后我们让它保持在那个状态,接着我们做了和现在即将做的完全一样的事:我们一次性关掉所有 safety systems(安全系统),然后观察这座装置两天。结果完全如我们所希望的那样:RCCS panels,也就是围绕 reactor core(反应堆堆芯)的这些 water jackets(水冷夹套),进入了 passive circulation mode(被动循环模式)。也就是说,水会沸腾,蒸汽离开,随后冷凝,带走热量,于是在没有任何运动部件的情况下形成自然循环。所以不需要操作员任何干预,electrical control(电气控制)里也没有运动部件。仅仅依靠这个系统的几何结构,它就能在两天时间里缓慢移除这些 decay heat(衰变热)。
Speaker 215:52 - 16:16
So we're about to demonstrate that right here starting on Friday after seventy two hours of full power. So that'll be really exciting demonstration, and it's really the basis of of scale. Right? If we're gonna do this, many times, we wanna make sure that just from the basic physics, this reactor doesn't melt down, not because of operator control, not because of really good engineering, but the physics of the plant make it safe for meltdown. Speaker 215:52 - 16:16
所以我们接下来就要在这里演示这一点,从周五开始,在连续 72 小时满功率运行之后进行。这会是一次非常令人兴奋的演示,而且这其实是实现 scale(规模化)的基础。对吧?如果我们要把这件事重复很多次,我们就必须确认,单凭最基本的 physics(物理规律),这个 reactor(反应堆)就不会 melt down(熔毁);不是因为操作员控制得好,不是因为工程做得特别优秀,而是因为这座装置本身的物理特性就让它在熔毁问题上具备安全性。
Speaker 316:16 - 16:39
One of the huge reasons for, the slowdown in investment in real r and d in this space has been concerns about the safety profile. You and your team are, you know, very respectful of, but not particularly concerned that this is an insurmountable problem. What do people outside nuclear misunderstand about safety of these SMRs and your design in particular? Speaker 316:16 - 16:39
这个领域里真正的 r and d(研发)投资之所以放缓,一个非常重要的原因,就是人们担心它的 safety profile(安全表现)。你和你的团队对此当然非常尊重,但似乎并不特别担心这会是一个无法克服的问题。对于这些 SMRs 以及尤其是你们的设计,核能行业外的人在安全性上有哪些误解?
Speaker 216:39 - 16:54
There's two big misunderstandings. One is that people, know, generally perceive nuclear as, like, stable, cheap baseload but kinda dangerous with downsides. I think that's just a complete misperception. Nuclear energy is the safest form of energy empirically. Mhmm. Speaker 216:39 - 16:54
有两个很大的误解。第一是,人们通常会把 nuclear(核能)理解成那种稳定、便宜、能提供 baseload(基荷)的能源,但同时又有点危险、带着不少负面代价。我认为这完全是一种误解。就经验数据而言,nuclear energy(核能)其实是最安全的能源形式。嗯。
Speaker 216:54 - 17:22
If you look at the amount of power generated versus the amount of amount of deaths, it's even safer than solar, which is very strange because how does someone die from solar? But, actually, most solar is installed on roofs, and people sometimes die falling off of a roof installing solar. And if you add those deaths up, it is actually a higher death per energy than the totality of nuclear energy in the world. So that's actually kind of crazy. Nuclear as it is today is already the safest form of energy. Speaker 216:54 - 17:22
如果你看发电量和死亡人数之间的关系,它甚至比 solar(太阳能)还安全。这听起来很奇怪,因为太阳能怎么会导致人死亡呢?但实际上,大多数 solar 都安装在屋顶上,而人们在屋顶安装 solar 时有时会因为坠落而死亡。如果把这些死亡都加总起来,按单位能源计算,它的死亡率实际上高于全球核能总体的死亡率。所以这件事其实挺疯狂的。按今天的现实情况来看,nuclear 本身就已经是最安全的能源形式了。
Speaker 217:22 - 17:44
Now the only problem with existing nuclear is that I I think the the existing philosophy again, it's the safest in the world, but we can do better. And where we'd like to improve is the existing philosophy says, okay. There's if you look at risk, it's actually composed of two different things. Right? It's composed of the odds of the thing happening and the consequence if it does happen. Speaker 217:22 - 17:44
现有 nuclear 唯一的问题在于,我认为现有的理念——再次强调,它已经是世界上最安全的了——但我们还可以做得更好。我们希望改进的地方在于,现有理念是这样看的:如果你分析 risk(风险),它其实由两个不同部分组成。对吧?一个是这件事发生的概率,另一个是它一旦发生所带来的后果。
Speaker 217:44 - 17:56
And traditional nuclear has focused on risk reduction by reducing the odds. Right? So they say, okay. Yeah. A meltdown could have some bad consequence, so let's make sure that it never ever ever happens. Speaker 217:44 - 17:56
而传统核能一直把降低风险的重点放在降低发生概率上。对吧?他们会说,好吧,是的,堆芯熔毁可能会带来一些严重后果,那我们就要确保它永远、永远、永远不会发生。
Speaker 217:56 - 18:11
And all of the effort into risk reduction goes into low odds of anything ever happening. The alternative way that you can reduce risk is actually just reducing consequence. Right? And we would argue that that's a much better way to reduce risk. Odds are stochastic. Speaker 217:56 - 18:11
所有投入到风险降低上的努力,基本都放在把任何事情发生的概率压到极低。另一种降低风险的方式,其实就是直接降低后果。对吧?而我们会认为,那才是更好的降风险方式。概率本身是随机的。
Speaker 218:11 - 18:26
Right? Even if you do an enormous amount of risk reduction on odds and you do all this engineering, something's still gonna happen. Right? Like, just something's gonna come out of left field, and you can't predict everything. And so advanced reactors tend to focus on consequence more than odds. Speaker 218:11 - 18:26
对吧?即使你在降低发生概率这件事上做了大量风险控制,也做了这么多工程设计,事情最终还是可能发生。对吧?总会有一些意料之外的情况冒出来,你不可能预见一切。所以 advanced reactors 往往比起概率,更关注后果。
Speaker 218:26 - 18:43
Now we still don't you know, we we we still try to protect against things like, you know, we have site security here, for example. Right? So someone can't come in and compromise the control room. But from an engineering perspective, we also say, well, what if someone did compromise the control room? How do we still make sure that it's perfectly safe? Speaker 218:26 - 18:43
当然,我们也不是不做那些防护——比如说,我们这里也有 site security(场址安保)。对吧?这样别人就不能闯进来并破坏 control room(控制室)。但从工程角度看,我们也会说,好,就算真的有人攻破了 control room 呢?我们怎样还能确保它依然绝对安全?
Speaker 218:43 - 18:55
And so advanced reactors really focus on that that second thing. Our safety basis when we go to the regulator is everything in the plant has failed. Absolutely everything. Right? Everything We Speaker 218:43 - 18:55
所以 advanced reactors 真正关注的是第二件事。我们向 regulator(监管机构)提交 safety basis(安全论证)时,假设是:装置里的所有东西都失效了。绝对所有东西。对吧?所有东西——我们
Speaker 318:55 - 18:56
know what happens. Speaker 318:55 - 18:56
知道会发生什么。
Speaker 218:56 - 19:06
Yeah. In fact, it is it is safe. Right? So we have regulatory limits where we say, okay, in an accident scenario, you can't dose the public with radiation. Right? Speaker 218:56 - 19:06
对。事实上,它仍然是安全的。对吧?我们有 regulatory limits(监管限值),规定说,好,在事故情景下,你不能让公众受到 radiation(辐射)剂量暴露。对吧?
Speaker 219:06 - 19:24
That's really ultimately what a nuclear regulator is trying to prevent. You can't dose public and workers with radiation. And so our safety basis says, alright, let's look at the reactor design and pretend that everything in it has failed. Are we dosing the workers in the public with radiation? And the answer is no. Speaker 219:06 - 19:24
这归根结底才是 nuclear regulator(核监管机构)真正要防止的事。你不能让公众和工作人员受到 radiation(辐射)剂量暴露。所以我们的 safety basis(安全论证)是:好,我们来看看这个 reactor(反应堆)的设计,并假定其中所有东西都失效了。那我们会不会让工作人员和公众受到 radiation(辐射)剂量暴露?答案是不会。
Speaker 219:24 - 19:43
And that's super, super important because even though we do still try to reduce the odds, we have site security, we make sure that our operators are well trained. We start with the worst case possible scenario where everything has failed, and we say, how do we make that that safe? And that's really a physics problem. It's really about the geometry of the core. It's about the materials that you use. Speaker 219:24 - 19:43
这一点非常、非常重要,因为尽管我们仍然会尽力降低风险概率,我们有 site security(场站安全),也会确保操作人员经过充分训练,但我们的出发点是从最坏情况下手:假设一切都失效了,然后我们问,怎样才能让这种情况依然是安全的?这本质上其实是一个 physics(物理)问题,真正涉及的是 reactor core(堆芯)的几何结构,以及你所使用的材料。
Speaker 219:43 - 20:06
Triso is a huge part of that, and and that's how we pursue safety. So I think that that people miss that, a, nuclear is already very safe, but, b, the new breed of root of nuclear is much more focused on just making sure that these plants are intrinsically and inherently safe regardless of odds, right, regardless of what crazy thing comes out of left field, and that's a much better way to scale. Speaker 219:43 - 20:06
Triso 在这方面占了非常大的一部分,这也是我们追求安全性的方式。所以我认为人们忽略了两点:第一,nuclear(核能)本身其实已经非常安全;第二,新一代 nuclear 的路线更加关注的是,无论概率如何、无论突然冒出什么离谱的意外,都要确保这些电站在本质上、内在上就是安全的,而这才是更好的规模化方式。
Speaker 320:06 - 20:11
What are the major causes of, like, reliability issues for a reactor? Speaker 320:06 - 20:11
像 reactor(反应堆)这类系统,可靠性问题的主要成因有哪些?
Speaker 220:11 - 20:29
Of this design, let's see. Helium circulator is one area that people have had trouble with in the past. The heat exchanger between the main helium loop and the secondary power conversion loop is something that fourteen Brands has had issues with. I don't know, Jess. What do you think? Speaker 220:11 - 20:29
就这种设计来说,我想想。Helium circulator(氦气循环机)是过去人们遇到过问题的一个环节。主 helium loop(氦气回路)和 secondary power conversion loop(二次功率转换回路)之间的 heat exchanger(换热器),也是 Fourteen Brands 曾经出过问题的地方。我不确定,Jess。你怎么看?
Speaker 520:29 - 20:44
Moisture as well. Fourteen Brands had problems with moisture. So graphite is hydrophilic, meaning that it loves to take moisture. Even in the hot desert air, hot dry desert air, it still sucks up moisture. So, we have mitigated that risk by having the helium purification system. Speaker 520:29 - 20:44
还有 moisture(湿气)问题。Fourteen Brands 就遇到过湿气方面的问题。graphite(石墨)是 hydrophilic(亲水)的,也就是说它很容易吸收水分。即使是在炎热干燥的沙漠空气里,它也还是会吸进水分。所以我们通过 helium purification system(氦气净化系统)来降低这种风险。
Speaker 520:44 - 21:13
And part of that is taking the moisture and trying to condense that moist air out of the system and then put it into some supply tanks or some to some storage tanks outside of that. We know it's it's a it's a known fact that for several hundred hours of operation, we'll be slowly leaching that moisture out of the graphite blocks as we keep keep them and maintain the temperature. So as you know, it's graphite ceramic, probably saw the block on the way in. So it's kinda difficult to migrate that moisture from the center of the block all the way out. That's why it takes so long. Speaker 520:44 - 21:13
这其中的一部分做法,就是把水分带出来,并尝试将这些含湿空气从系统中冷凝出来,然后送入一些 supply tanks(供应罐)或者外部的 storage tanks(储罐)中。我们知道,这已经是一个明确事实:在数百小时的运行过程中,随着我们持续维持温度,graphite blocks(石墨块)中的水分会被缓慢析出。你也知道,它是 graphite ceramic(石墨陶瓷),你进来的路上可能也看到了那些块体。所以,要让水分从块体中心一路迁移到外部,其实相当困难,这也是为什么会花这么长时间。
Speaker 521:13 - 21:31
It's just keeping up to temperature and slowly migrates its way out in the blocks. But if you don't capture that moisture and remove it from the system, then you can imagine any carbon steel, which is in the system, will be in the rust. Then those rust particles will migrate and either cause a shortage in the motor or a blockage in the system somewhere. So anyway, that's one of the lessons learned from forcing brownness. You need to Speaker 521:13 - 21:31
基本上就是保持温度,让水分在这些块体中慢慢迁移出来。但如果你不把这些水分捕获并从系统里移除,那你可以想象,系统中任何 carbon steel(碳钢)都会生锈。然后这些锈蚀颗粒会迁移,要么导致 motor(电机)短路,要么在系统某处造成堵塞。总之,这就是我们从 Fort St. Vrain 学到的经验之一。你必须关注
Speaker 221:31 - 22:03
on the moisture. I will say that helium graphite systems have a lot of natural advantages. And you know there's basically no chemistry going on other than the bit of moisture that we need to pull out of the graphite blocks. Helium is inert, right? And unlike a water based reactor where you have you're very, very carefully trying to make sure you have dry steam if it's dry steam plant and wet steam is going to start just destroying all of your thermal machinery and everything, helium is, a very, very inert simple chemical to work as a working fluid. Speaker 221:31 - 22:03
moisture(湿气)。我要说的是,helium-graphite systems(氦气-石墨系统)有很多天然优势。你知道,除了我们需要从 graphite blocks(石墨块)中抽出的那一点点水分之外,基本上没有什么 chemistry(化学反应)在发生。Helium 是惰性的,对吧?而且 unlike water-based reactor(水基反应堆),后者需要非常、非常小心地确保如果是 dry steam plant(干蒸汽装置)就必须得到干蒸汽,因为湿蒸汽会开始破坏你所有的热力机械和其他设备;相比之下,helium 作为 working fluid(工作流体),是一种非常、非常惰性且简单的介质。
Speaker 222:03 - 22:13
Now there are downsides to it. It's not very dense. You have to have more pumping power, these sorts of things. But the fundamentals are in our favor in terms of building a very simple plant. Speaker 222:03 - 22:13
当然这也有缺点。它的密度没那么高。你需要更大的泵送功率,诸如此类。但就建设一个非常简单的工厂而言,底层条件其实是对我们有利的。
Speaker 322:13 - 22:16
When we think about, you know, an abundance of nuclear power Speaker 322:13 - 22:16
当我们思考,你知道,充足的 nuclear power(核能)时,
Speaker 222:16 - 22:17
Yeah. Speaker 322:17 - 22:40
I think a lot of interested listeners will have heard of a number of SMR startups and people building larger scale reactors. How do you how do you break out, like, the different use cases and the different designs here? Are are people aiming at different power levels and efficiencies? Is it just a completely different philosophy of company? How do you how do you look at that landscape? Speaker 322:17 - 22:40
我想很多感兴趣的听众都听说过不少 SMR startup,以及一些在建造更大规模 reactor(反应堆)的人。那么你会怎么区分这里不同的 use case(使用场景)和不同的设计?大家是在瞄准不同的功率水平和效率吗?还是说这完全是不同的公司哲学?你是怎么看待这个格局的?
Speaker 222:40 - 22:59
Yeah. I would make one big division in nuclear companies, and it is people who believe that nuclear is essentially a hardware execution problem and people who believe that it's a design problem. Valor is solidly in the camp that we believe this is a hardware execution problem. This is really an issue of can you build reactors? Can you turn them on? Speaker 222:40 - 22:59
对。我会先把 nuclear company(核能公司)做一个大的划分:一类人认为 nuclear 本质上是一个 hardware execution(硬件落地执行)问题,另一类人认为它是一个设计问题。Valor 很明确属于前一派,我们相信这是一个 hardware execution 问题。这真正的关键在于,你能不能把 reactor(反应堆)造出来?能不能把它启动起来?
Speaker 222:59 - 23:08
Can you get them running? Can you operate them well? Can you produce them at scale? Can you go from making one to 10 to a 100 to a thousand? That is the the problem of nuclear. Speaker 222:59 - 23:08
你能不能让它跑起来?能不能把它运营好?能不能规模化生产?能不能从造 1 台,走到 10 台、100 台、1000 台?这才是 nuclear 的问题所在。
Speaker 223:09 - 23:34
The second class of nuclear companies, I think, are mistaken, think that this is a a problem of, like, making the most beautiful design, making the most sophisticated design. The design will have, you know, the most perfect efficiency. You know, you look inside some of these these design documents, and there's so much complexity. And, you know, the materials that go into it are super rare, and you have to set up entire supply chains that don't exist just to get the thing running. And I look at that and I say, okay. Speaker 223:09 - 23:34
我认为第二类 nuclear company 是搞错了,他们觉得这是一个类似于把设计做得尽可能漂亮、尽可能复杂精密的问题。这个设计会有,你知道,最完美的效率。你去看其中一些设计文档,里面复杂度高得惊人。而且,你知道,里面用到的材料又极其稀有,你甚至得先建立起一整套原本并不存在的 supply chain(供应链),才能让这东西跑起来。我看到这种情况就会说,好吧。
Speaker 223:34 - 23:54
Maybe over time the reactor grows in complexity and you start to use some more rare materials to try to get higher and higher performance. But the problem of nuclear today is like the Toyota Camry problem. Right? Like, we don't wanna make Lamborghinis. We want to make a very simple, very cheap, very safe reactor that we can make literally tens of thousands of. Speaker 223:34 - 23:54
也许随着时间推移,reactor 会变得越来越复杂,你也会开始使用一些更稀有的材料,来追求越来越高的性能。但 nuclear 今天面临的问题,更像是 Toyota Camry 的问题。对吧?我们不想造 Lamborghini。我们想造的是一种非常简单、非常便宜、非常安全,而且我们确实能一口气造出几万台的 reactor。
Speaker 223:54 - 24:08
And, actually, that is going to make the cheapest energy in the world. Right? You maybe will get a little bit better performance out of a more complicated reactor, but I'm gonna beat you on cost because I'm making a thousand of them. Right? And that's really what we care about. Speaker 223:54 - 24:08
而事实上,那才会造就全球最便宜的能源。对吧?更复杂的 reactor 也许能带来一点更好的性能,但我会在成本上击败你,因为我是在造 1000 台。对吧?而这才是我们真正关心的。
Speaker 224:08 - 24:30
Valor is in the business of making energy 10 times cheaper for for humanity, and we want to continue doing that forever. There will always be ways to make energy cheaper and cheaper, and that's very much our goal. And I think the big difference in in philosophy is do you tackle that through building reactors and through iteration, or do you tackle that through design? And and we believe it's entirely a hardware problem. Speaker 224:08 - 24:30
Valor 从事的是让全人类的能源成本降低 10 倍的事业,而且我们希望永远持续做这件事。总会有办法让能源变得越来越便宜,而这正是我们的目标。我认为,理念上的巨大差别在于:你是通过建造 reactors 并不断迭代来解决这个问题,还是通过 design 来解决?而我们相信,这完全是一个 hardware(硬件)问题。
Speaker 324:31 - 24:41
Where and the so the company is less than three years old, just about to turn three. Yep. Where in the timeline of, you know, hundreds of reactors are we? Speaker 324:31 - 24:41
所以,这家公司成立还不到三年,差不多快满三年了。对。那么在“数百座 reactors”的这条时间线上,我们现在走到哪一步了?
Speaker 224:41 - 24:49
Yeah. We just turned on number one. So we went critical back in November. That was our first criticality. That was what you'd call a a cold criticality or critical pile. Speaker 224:41 - 24:49
对,我们刚刚启动了第一座。我们在去年 11 月达到了 criticality(临界)。那是我们的第一次 criticality。那属于你所谓的 cold criticality,或者说 critical pile。
Speaker 224:50 - 25:13
And just a few days ago, we made power for the first time in our first reactor. So that's the the Ward 250 reactor. Obviously, the next goal is go turn on another one, but there's a sort of a success metric here that we talk about in the company, and and we call it tick rate. So tick rate is is how we judge ourselves and how we judge other people in the nuclear field. Tick rate is you know, comes from video games. Speaker 224:50 - 25:13
就在几天前,我们的第一座 reactor 第一次发出了电。那就是 Ward 250 reactor。显然,下一个目标是再启动一座,不过这里有一个我们在公司内部会讨论的成功指标,我们把它叫做 tick rate。tick rate 是我们评判自己、也评判 nuclear 领域其他人的方式。tick rate 这个说法,你知道,是从 video games 来的。
Speaker 225:13 - 25:31
Right? And it's sort of the the time in between changes in the game state. Right? And for us, what this means is how long from the founding of our company to the first time we split an Adam to the second time to the third time to the fourth time. And the goal of the company is to get that tick rate as low as possible. Speaker 225:13 - 25:31
对吧?它指的是游戏状态两次变化之间的时间。对我们来说,它的意思是:从公司成立开始,到我们第一次 split an atom(分裂原子),再到第二次、第三次、第四次,中间分别要多久。而公司的目标,就是把这个 tick rate 压到尽可能低。
Speaker 225:32 - 25:55
Right? So our first ever mark from filing in Delaware to first atom split was two years and four months. From Project Nova, first atom split to the second time here in this reactor was about seven months. And the goal is to get that window as short as possible, and we will get it down to minutes. This company will get will will get to the point where we have a new reactor turning on every few minutes. Speaker 225:32 - 25:55
对吧?我们第一次的纪录,是从在 Delaware 完成注册到第一次 split an atom,用了两年四个月。从 Project Nova 第一次 split an atom,到这座 reactor 里的第二次,大约用了七个月。我们的目标是把这个时间窗口尽可能缩短,而我们会把它压缩到以分钟计。这家公司会发展到这样一个阶段:每隔几分钟,就有一座新的 reactor 启动。
Speaker 225:55 - 26:07
And when we do that, if you look at the the economics of nuclear, it really is driven by how quickly and cheaply can you produce plants. Right? The uranium is very cheap. Right? The the fuel is very cheap. Speaker 225:55 - 26:07
而一旦做到这一点,如果你看 nuclear 的 economics(经济性),真正的驱动因素其实是:你能多快、多便宜地建造 plants。对吧?uranium 很便宜。对吧?fuel 也很便宜。
Speaker 226:07 - 26:31
The question is, can you produce plants quickly and cheaply? And that is going to be driven by iteration and by scale, which ultimately is driven by tick rate. So I'm very proud of the team. We've done some enormous, incredible things that no other nuclear startup has been able to do yet, but we are nowhere near done. We're very hungry, and we're gonna make that tick rate, you know, six months and then four and then one and then into the minutes. Speaker 226:07 - 26:31
问题在于,你能不能快速且低成本地建造 plants?而这将取决于 iteration(迭代)和 scale(规模),归根结底,又取决于 tick rate。所以我为团队感到非常自豪。我们已经完成了一些巨大而惊人的事情,是其他任何 nuclear startup 都还没做到的,但我们离完成还差得远。我们依然充满饥饿感,我们会把这个 tick rate 做到六个月、四个月、一个月,然后进入以分钟计的阶段。
Speaker 126:31 - 26:50
Welcome to OR two fifty. Wow. So where you are standing right now is the first advanced reactor to ever make power by a startup. The first advanced reactor ever built outside of a national laboratory. This is the fifth new nuclear device to make power in The United States since the year 2000. Speaker 126:31 - 26:50
欢迎来到 OR two fifty。哇。你们现在所站的位置,是有史以来第一座由 startup 建造并实现发电的 advanced reactor(先进反应堆)。这是第一座在 national laboratory 之外建成的 advanced reactor。自 2000 年以来,这也是 The United States 第五个实现发电的新 nuclear device(核装置)。
Speaker 126:51 - 27:33
Valor is the only private company founded since the discovery of nuclear fission that has ever made nuclear power. And this is really the thing that that is unique about what we're doing is that we're a new team. We're a new company, and we're attacking nuclear fission from first principles. You all the other companies in the space who've actually made power before were, you know, are a 100 year old or a 150 year old utilities, defense contractors, large engineering corporations, and they haven't really done fundamental r and d. What they've done is they've picked up sort of government work, commercialized it a little bit, done some supply chain integration, but this is like startup mindset applied to nuclear fission and there's a lot of things about this plant that's different that you'll be able to see. Speaker 126:51 - 27:33
Valor 是自 nuclear fission(核裂变)被发现以来,唯一一家真正实现过 nuclear power(核能发电)的 private company。我们所做事情真正独特的地方就在于:我们是一支新团队。我们是一家新公司,而且我们是从 first principles(第一性原理)出发来攻克 nuclear fission。这个领域里其他那些真正发过电的公司,你也知道,基本上都是有 100 年或 150 年历史的 utilities、公防承包商、或大型 engineering corporations,而且他们其实并没有做真正基础性的 r and d。他们做的更多是承接一些 government work,把它稍微 commercialize(一点商业化),再做一些 supply chain integration(供应链整合);而我们则是把 startup mindset 应用到 nuclear fission 上。这个 plant(工厂/电站)有很多不同之处,接下来你们都能看到。
Speaker 127:34 - 27:53
The first one is what we're looking at right here. This big awesome structure is called the Modular Citadel. I'm gonna talk to you for a few minutes about concrete and it's gonna sound like I'm a big concrete nerd and I guess that's okay. But this is actually some of the more innovative stuff that we've done in this reactor. The purpose of this concrete is a BioShield. Speaker 127:34 - 27:53
第一项不同,就是我们现在眼前看到的这个东西。这个巨大又很震撼的结构叫做 Modular Citadel。接下来几分钟我要跟你们讲讲 concrete,这听起来可能像我是个特别痴迷 concrete 的 nerd,不过我觉得也没关系。因为这其实是我们这个 reactor 里最具创新性的部分之一。这些 concrete 的用途,是作为 BioShield(生物屏蔽层)。
Speaker 127:53 - 28:29
The reason we're able to stand here and not be receiving unhealthy doses of radiation right now is because there's 78 inches of concrete in front of this reactor. If this concrete were not here we would not be able to stand here but it's actually very special concrete. The modular citadel is a series of precast blocks So each of these blocks was actually created in a factory. It's our factory. We have a what we call the Citadel factory in Salt Lake City and we have a production line where we could create 3,000 blocks a year that are identical to these. Speaker 127:53 - 28:29
我们现在之所以能站在这里,而不会受到不健康剂量的 radiation(辐射),是因为这个 reactor 前面有 78 英寸厚的 concrete。如果没有这层 concrete,我们根本不可能站在这里。但这其实是一种非常特殊的 concrete。这个 modular citadel 是由一系列 precast blocks(预制砌块)组成的。所以这里每一块 block 实际上都是在工厂里制造出来的——是我们的工厂。我们在 Salt Lake City 有一座我们称之为 Citadel factory 的工厂,那里有一条 production line,每年可以制造 3,000 块与这些完全相同的 block。
Speaker 128:30 - 28:43
And they arrive here on a truck, and then they get placed by this crane up here. So that's why we have this crane. They can place these blocks. And what's really awesome about this is people have thought about doing this before in nuclear. They thought about free cast blocks. Speaker 128:30 - 28:43
然后它们会通过卡车运到这里,再由上面的这台 crane 吊装就位。所以我们才会有这台 crane,它就是用来安放这些 block 的。真正很棒的一点在于,过去其实也有人在 nuclear 领域考虑过这么做。他们也想过使用 precast blocks。
Speaker 128:43 - 29:13
But the problem is, well, if you're gonna put two concrete blocks together, if you were to zoom in on a microscopic level, those blocks are actually not touching. Right? Nothing's actually touching on a microscopic level. You have a little gap between there, and gamma rays can slip between the gaps, and neutrons can slip between the gaps. So what you can't see here and I'll show you some photos afterward is that if you were to look with an x-ray in that seam right there you would actually see that the concrete itself follows what we call a tortuous path. Speaker 128:43 - 29:13
但问题在于,如果你要把两块 concrete block 拼在一起,从微观层面放大来看,这两块 block 实际上并没有真正接触,对吧?在微观层面上,没有任何东西是真正贴合的。中间会有一个很小的缝隙,而 gamma rays(伽马射线)可以从这些缝隙中穿过去,neutrons(中子)也可以从这些缝隙中穿过去。所以你们现在看不到的是——我之后会给你们看一些照片——如果你用 x-ray 去看那条接缝,你其实会发现 concrete 本身走的是一条我们称为 tortuous path(曲折路径)的路线。
Speaker 129:14 - 29:38
So it's a sine wave. So the concrete on every seam follows a sine wave curve and actually on the vertical edges as well. So if you were looking at vertical seam you would also see a sine wave. If you were to look in the corners you would see a sine wave. There is no straight path from the inside of the reactor to the outside through the modular citadel for a ray to follow straight through concrete. Speaker 129:14 - 29:38
也就是说,它是一条 sine wave(正弦波)。每一道接缝中的 concrete 都沿着 sine wave 曲线延展,垂直边缘也是一样。所以如果你去看垂直接缝,你也会看到 sine wave;如果你去看角落,你也会看到 sine wave。对于任何射线来说,都不存在一条能从 reactor 内部穿过 modular citadel 直达外部的直线路径。
Speaker 129:39 - 30:03
And what's even more interesting is that traditionally when people have thought of this, because it's really hard to get that casting shape right and to get it to actually be solid enough to bear all of this weight, the way that they get around this is they would grout it. So they would grout it with more concrete. You'd have like sort of a wet concrete mix that you use to seal them together. This has no grout. These blocks are literally just stacked. Speaker 129:39 - 30:03
更有意思的是,传统上人们在考虑这种设计时,因为要把这种铸造形状做准确、同时又让它足够坚固以承受这么大的重量,难度非常高,所以通常会采用 grout(灌浆)来解决。也就是说,他们会再用一些 concrete 来灌缝。你可以把它理解为一种比较湿的 concrete 混合料,用来把这些块体密封在一起。而这里完全没有 grout。这些 block 真的就只是直接堆叠起来的。
Speaker 130:03 - 30:12
In fact there's no mechanical lock between them either. There are no bolts. There are no screws. We do have this frame around it. This is called a seismic frame. Speaker 130:03 - 30:12
事实上,它们之间也没有任何机械锁定结构。没有螺栓。没有螺丝。我们确实在它周围做了这个框架。这叫作 seismic frame。
Speaker 130:12 - 30:40
We did this we actually don't need it according to our engineering calculations. The Utah State Building Code, there's a disagreement about whether or not we need a seismic frame. They're like, oh, let's just put it on just to be safe. But the entire Citadel has no fastening of any kind in the blocks. And what that means is we went from three months, which is what it would normally take to build a BioShield like this, to we stack this in about forty two hours. Speaker 130:12 - 30:40
我们做这个其实是因为,按照我们的工程计算,根本不需要它。Utah State Building Code 对我们是否需要 seismic frame 这一点存在分歧。他们的意思是,哦,为了保险起见还是装上吧。但整个 Citadel 的这些模块之间没有任何形式的紧固件。这意味着,我们把建造这样一个 BioShield 通常需要的三个月时间,缩短到了大约四十二小时就能堆叠完成。
Speaker 330:40 - 30:47
How do you explain the pace of what you're capable of doing here versus other people that are trying and have been trying? Speaker 330:40 - 30:47
你怎么解释你们在这里所能达到的这种速度,相比其他那些正在尝试、而且已经尝试了很久的人?
Speaker 230:47 - 31:06
Yeah. The pace is extraordinary. And, you know, of course, I'm proud of my team. Of course, I'm, I think Valor is the best nuclear company out there, but I would argue empirically, we have the the highest pace of any nuclear company in the world, and it's not close. And the reason for that is two things. Speaker 230:47 - 31:06
是的,这个速度非常惊人。而且,你知道,我当然为我的团队感到自豪。我当然也认为 Valor 是目前最好的 nuclear company,但如果从经验事实来看,我会说我们拥有全球所有 nuclear company 里最高的推进速度,而且差距非常大。原因有两个。
Speaker 231:06 - 31:41
One is we are obsessed with simplicity. We want our designs to be as simple as possible. We would rather have a simpler machine that's easier to build that we can build at higher scale than a machine that's more efficient, that's more performant. We have ruthlessly deleted complexity, deleted parts, deleted systems where they're not necessary. The other thing is we picked a super safe architecture, and and this is, I think, a point that it's hard to tell from the outside because every reactor looks the same from the outside, and and every CEO says that the reactor is safe. Speaker 231:06 - 31:41
第一,我们痴迷于简单性。我们希望自己的设计尽可能简单。相比一台效率更高、性能更强的机器,我们宁愿要一台更简单、更容易建造、也更容易实现大规模制造的机器。我们极其坚决地删除复杂性,删除零部件,删除不必要的系统。第二点是,我们选择了一种超级安全的 architecture,而这一点我认为从外部很难看出来,因为每一种 reactor 从外面看都差不多,而且每个 CEO 都会说自己的 reactor 很安全。
Speaker 231:41 - 32:04
And and and to some extent, they all are, right, because they're highly regulated, and we make sure that they're safe. But there are levels to this. Right? And it goes back to the the previous conversation we had about odds versus consequence. A tracer fueled graphite moderated helium cooled reactor of the geometry that we've built it here is just about as safe as humanity knows how to build a nuclear reactor, and that actually allows us to move faster. Speaker 231:41 - 32:04
而且在某种程度上,它们确实都安全,对吧?因为这个行业受到高度监管,我们也会确保它们是安全的。但安全也是有层级差别的,对吧?这就回到我们之前谈过的概率与后果的问题。采用 TRISO fuel(燃料)、graphite moderated(石墨慢化)、helium cooled(氦冷却)的 reactor,再加上我们这里采用的这种几何结构,几乎已经是人类所知道的最安全的 nuclear reactor 建造方式了,而这实际上让我们能够推进得更快。
Speaker 232:04 - 32:19
Right? And that's going to allow us to scale as well. The lower that we can keep that consequence, the greater we're gonna be able to scale and the faster we're gonna be able to move. The last thing is just the way that we have shaped this team. I have built this team very, very carefully. Speaker 232:04 - 32:19
对吧?这也会让我们能够扩展规模。我们把后果控制得越低,我们就越有能力扩大规模,推进得也会越快。最后一点,就是我们塑造这个团队的方式。我是非常、非常谨慎地组建这个团队的。
Speaker 232:19 - 32:44
I am deeply involved in every hiring decision, and we have filtered nuclear as an industry for people with extreme agency, people with extreme bias to action. And, actually, we we have a lot of people from outside nuclear. Right? A lot of the people here now have more nuclear experience than, you know, any other startup because they've actually turned a plant on. But when they walked in, they had never seen a nuclear reactor before. Speaker 232:19 - 32:44
我深度参与每一个招聘决定,我们在 nuclear 这个行业里筛选的是那种具有极强 agency(主动性)的人,具有极强 bias to action(行动倾向)的人。而且实际上,我们有很多人来自 nuclear 之外的行业。对吧?现在这里很多人已经比其他任何 startup 的人都更有 nuclear 经验了,因为他们真的把一座工厂启动起来了。但当他们刚走进这里时,他们此前从未见过 nuclear reactor。
Speaker 232:44 - 33:01
But what they had done is built hard things in the real world. Right? And so we try to find those people who built hard things. And then within nuclear, I particularly love to find people that started in nuclear because they loved it, and they realized it was really slow. And then they left, and they're like, screw this. Speaker 232:44 - 33:01
但他们真正做过的,是在现实世界里把困难的事情造出来。对吧?所以我们会去找那些做过难事的人。而在 nuclear 这个领域里,我尤其喜欢找这样的人:他们最初进入 nuclear 是因为热爱它,后来意识到这个行业实在太慢了,于是离开了,然后心想,去他的。
Speaker 233:01 - 33:27
I'm gonna go do something interesting. And then they, you know, built a ton of hardware somewhere else, and then I convinced them to come back. Because I know that they love it, and I'm like, if you come back here, you're gonna be able to actually build and actually execute, but in something that that I know you love. So, also lots of people from the traditional nuclear world, but but those people we filter very, very hard for, do you wanna do science? Do you wanna, like, write papers, or do you want to build reactors and turn them on? Speaker 233:01 - 33:27
我要去做点真正有意思的事。然后他们,你知道,就在别的地方做了大量 hardware(硬件)项目,之后再被我说服回来。因为我知道他们是真心热爱这个领域的,我会对他们说,如果你回来,你就真的能把东西造出来,真的能执行落地,而且还是在一个我知道你热爱的方向上。所以,我们也有很多人来自传统 nuclear 行业,但对这类人我们筛选得非常、非常严格:你是想做 science(科学研究)?想写 papers(论文)?还是想建 reactors(反应堆)并把它们启动起来?
Speaker 233:28 - 33:30
And, the entire Valor team is laser focused on that. Speaker 233:28 - 33:30
而整个 Valor 团队都把全部注意力高度集中在这件事上。
Speaker 333:32 - 33:44
How much of the premise of Valor is possible now comes from there are increasing demands for power, you know, in The United States largely driven by AI compute? Speaker 333:32 - 33:44
Valor 这一设想现在有多大程度上之所以可行,是因为电力需求正在增长——比如在 The United States,很大程度上是由 AI compute(AI 算力)推动的?
Speaker 233:44 - 34:04
Yeah. So I'm super grateful for, you know, all our partners in in the AI space. NVIDIA, of course, who got a big event that we're talking about today, and we'll talk about that more in a minute what we did here with NVIDIA. But I would like to point out that energy being a commodity, the demand is set by the price. Right? Speaker 233:44 - 34:04
是的。所以我非常感谢我们在 AI 领域的所有合作伙伴。当然也包括 NVIDIA,他们有一场很重要的活动,也是我们今天在谈的内容,等会儿我们还会多讲一点我们和 NVIDIA 在这里做了什么。不过我想指出的是,既然 energy(能源)是一种 commodity(大宗商品),那么需求就是由价格决定的。对吧?
Speaker 234:04 - 34:18
So if you can reduce the price, you increase the demand, and that will be true about energy forever. Right? From now until the end of time, we know that energy is is sort of the only scarce thing in the universe. Right? It's the only irreversible thing in the universe in terms of a resource. Speaker 234:04 - 34:18
所以,如果你能把价格降下来,需求就会上升,而对于能源来说,这一点永远都会成立。对吧?从现在直到时间尽头,我们都知道,energy 某种意义上是宇宙中唯一稀缺的东西。对吧?就资源而言,它也是宇宙中唯一不可逆的东西。
Speaker 234:18 - 34:37
And so if you can figure out how to make energy cheaper, you will have demand. And and so I I view valor as having a fundamentally infinite market because if we can figure out how to make, you know, energy at 1¢, you induce your own demand. Right? We begin to imagine ways to do things better with cheaper energy. If you can make it a tenth of a cent, you've induced even more. Speaker 234:18 - 34:37
所以,如果你能想办法让 energy 更便宜,你就一定会有需求。因此我认为,Valor 面对的是一个从根本上近乎无限的市场,因为如果我们能把能源成本做到 1¢,你就会自己创造出需求。对吧?我们会开始设想,如何用更便宜的能源把事情做得更好。如果你能把成本做到十分之一美分,那你创造出的需求还会更多。
Speaker 234:37 - 35:01
And so, yes, it's awesome that we have these, you know, tailwinds of customers who are really hungry for power. I think it's also great just from a a public awareness perspective where suddenly everyone remembers that power is super important. Right? But I also know that fundamentally making energy cheaper is what induces demand for more energy, and that's really gonna be our strategy for the next century. Speaker 234:37 - 35:01
所以,是的,我们现在有这些顺风因素,拥有一批极度渴望电力的客户,这很棒。我也认为,从公众认知的角度看,这同样很好,因为大家突然又想起来,电力是极其重要的。对吧?但我也知道,从根本上说,真正会催生更多能源需求的,是让 energy 变得更便宜,而这也将是我们未来一个世纪的战略。
Speaker 335:01 - 35:04
Can you talk about what you are doing with NVIDIA? Speaker 335:01 - 35:04
你能谈谈你们正在和 NVIDIA 做什么吗?
Speaker 235:04 - 35:26
Yes. So we did something pretty awesome today. We powered the first ever AI chip powered by a nuclear reactor. So we took an NVIDIA Blackwell, super grateful to them for providing the system to us, and we connected it directly to our nuclear reactor. And we actually hosted the nuclear website. Speaker 235:04 - 35:26
可以。我们今天做了一件非常厉害的事。我们让历史上第一块由核反应堆供电的 AI chip(AI 芯片)运行起来了。我们拿了一块 NVIDIA Blackwell,非常感谢他们向我们提供这套系统,然后我们把它直接连接到了我们的核反应堆上。而且我们实际上还托管了那个 nuclear 网站。
Speaker 235:26 - 35:37
So depending on when this podcast drops, you'll be able to see it. If you go to nuclearwebsite.com, that website is directly hosted on the nuclear reactor. It is entirely coming from that chip provided by Speaker 235:26 - 35:37
所以这要看这期播客什么时候发布,你到时候应该就能看到了。如果你访问 nuclearwebsite.com,那个网站就是直接托管在核反应堆上的。它完全来自那块由……提供的 chip(芯片)。
Speaker 335:38 - 35:39
I'm gonna consume some nuclear power. Nice. Speaker 335:38 - 35:39
我要去消耗一点核能了。不错。
Speaker 235:39 - 36:04
Actually, on the website, you go on it right now, we tell you exactly how many atoms of uranium were split in order to deliver that web page to you. We've we've always been asked if we're gonna sell merch, I've always said that we're not gonna sell any merch until we've actually split an atom. And so, actually, the nuclear website is the only place you can buy Valor merch. So you actually have to buy it hosted from the reactor. So we we take billing in the physical world very seriously. Speaker 235:39 - 36:04
其实,在那个网站上,你现在就可以去看,我们会准确告诉你,为了把那个网页传送给你,究竟裂变了多少个 uranium atom(铀原子)。一直以来大家都在问我们会不会卖 merch(周边),而我一直都说,在我们真正裂变一个原子之前,我们不会卖任何 merch。所以实际上,nuclear 网站是你唯一能买到 Valor merch 的地方。也就是说,你必须从那个由反应堆托管的网站上购买。所以我们对现实世界里的 billing(计费)是非常认真的。
Speaker 236:05 - 36:15
The other thing is if you're watching this podcast too late, you're not gonna be able to see it anymore because once the reactor turns off, the the website is directly hosted from there, so it won't be available anymore. So there's some exclusivity too as well. Speaker 236:05 - 36:15
另一件事是,如果你太晚才看到这期播客,那你就再也看不到它了,因为一旦反应堆关闭,那个网站就是直接从那里托管出来的,所以它也就无法访问了。所以这件事也带有一点独家性质。
Speaker 336:15 - 36:16
So got to tune in while it's live. Speaker 336:15 - 36:16
所以得趁它还在线的时候去看。
Speaker 236:16 - 36:25
That's right. You have to tune in while the reactor's running. We'll keep it running for a few days as we continue our final testing, and we'll go through various tests over the next few months. Speaker 236:16 - 36:25
没错。你必须在反应堆运行的时候收看。我们会在接下来几天里继续让它运行,同时完成最后测试;在接下来的几个月里,我们还会进行各种测试。
Speaker 336:26 - 36:54
When you go talk to the big buyers of compute and thus power today, they will say nobody can deliver at scale until like '31, '32. And until then, it's gonna be diesel gensets and maybe solar and batteries. And, you know, we gotta figure out how to make it until that period of time. What do you believe that they don't believe about the next five years? Speaker 336:26 - 36:54
当你今天去和那些 compute(算力)的大买家、也因此是 power(电力)大买家交流时,他们会说,在大概 2031、2032 年之前,没有人能实现大规模交付。在那之前,只能靠 diesel gensets(柴油发电机组),也许再加上 solar(太阳能)和 batteries(电池)。而且,你知道,我们得想办法撑到那个时间点。对于接下来的五年,你相信什么是他们不相信的?
Speaker 236:54 - 37:06
Yeah. I think that they've looked at all of these nuclear companies of the past. And, again, most of the nuclear industry is a modeling and simulation industry. That's really what it is. If you you know, companies are what they do. Speaker 236:54 - 37:06
对。我认为他们看过过去那些 nuclear(核能)公司。再说一次,核能行业的大部分,其实是一个 modeling and simulation(建模与仿真)行业。它本质上就是这样。因为如果你仔细想想,companies are what they do(公司就是它们实际在做的事)。
Speaker 237:06 - 37:11
Right? And so I actually did not allow Valor Atomics to call ourselves a nuclear startup until we had So Speaker 237:06 - 37:11
对吧?所以实际上,在我们做到那一步之前,我都不允许 Valor Atomics 把自己称作一家 nuclear startup(核能创业公司)。所以——
Speaker 337:11 - 37:13
you're a concrete pouring in graphite. Speaker 337:11 - 37:13
你们当时不过是在浇筑混凝土、往里放 graphite(石墨)。
Speaker 237:13 - 37:22
We we are legitimately a nuclear company because we split atoms. Right? Mhmm. But, you know, I'm I'm serious. We didn't allow ourselves to call ourselves a nuclear startup until we'd split the first atom. Speaker 237:13 - 37:22
我们现在是货真价实的 nuclear company(核能公司),因为我们真的 split atoms(裂变了原子)。对吧?嗯。但你知道,我是认真的。在裂变第一个原子之前,我们不允许自己称自己为 nuclear startup。
Speaker 237:22 - 37:33
Right? Because companies are what they do. Before that, we were a company that was planning to split an atom. Now we're a company that has done it, you know, 10 to the 20 or so atoms so far. That number will keep going up. Speaker 237:22 - 37:33
对吧?因为 companies are what they do。那之前,我们是一家“计划去裂变原子”的公司。现在我们是一家已经做到这件事的公司——到目前为止,大概已经裂变了 10 的 20 次方个原子左右。这个数字还会继续增长。
Speaker 237:34 - 37:55
But yeah. So I I think there's a a just a big gap in mindset between are you serious about scale? And I would also point out that exponential curves are very counterintuitive. Right? If you look at the predictions of how many satellites would be in orbit when when SpaceX started going, people were like, there's no way they're gonna hit the numbers that they're hitting today. Speaker 237:34 - 37:55
不过,是的。我认为这里存在一个很大的 mindset(思维方式)差距:你到底是不是认真想做 scale(规模化)?而且我还想指出,exponential curves(指数曲线)是非常反直觉的,对吧?如果你看 SpaceX 刚开始发展时,人们对未来轨道上卫星数量的预测,大家当时都会说,他们绝不可能达到今天这样的数字。
Speaker 237:55 - 38:22
And exponentials are just really, really hard for for humans to understand. So I would say, yeah, if you're looking at the nuclear space today, you don't expect people to have this problem solved in 2031. In fact, I would say even 2035, a lot of these companies are still not gonna get there because they have the wrong mindset. They're not focused on hardware iteration, hardware execution, building the simplest and safest reactor that allows them to scale, and Valor just demonstrated that we are. Speaker 237:55 - 38:22
而 exponential(指数增长)这种东西,对人类来说确实非常、非常难理解。所以我会说,如果你今天看 nuclear space(核能领域),你不会预期人们能在 2031 年解决这个问题。事实上,我甚至会说,到了 2035 年,这些公司里仍然会有很多到不了那一步,因为他们的 mindset 不对。他们没有专注于 hardware iteration(硬件迭代)、hardware execution(硬件落地执行),没有去建造那种既最简单又最安全、并且能让他们实现规模化的 reactor(反应堆);而 Valor 刚刚证明了,我们是专注于这些事的。
Speaker 138:22 - 38:43
We actually had to invent our own grade of concrete in order to do this. And the reason is we need a high enough density to block gamma rays. The concrete also needs to be very strong because these are self stacking blocks. And we also can't use rebar because if we use rebar, rebar becomes activated by neutrons. So you'll actually be producing nuclear waste. Speaker 138:22 - 38:43
为了做到这件事,我们实际上不得不自己发明一种混凝土等级。原因是,我们需要足够高的密度来阻挡 gamma rays(伽马射线)。这种混凝土还必须非常坚固,因为这些是可以自行堆叠的模块。而且我们也不能使用 rebar,因为一旦使用 rebar,它会被 neutrons(中子)活化。那样你实际上就在制造 nuclear waste(核废料)。
Speaker 138:43 - 39:17
We took two two engineers on our team. One of them is a nuclear physics mechanical sorry. One of the mechanical engineer, of nuclear physics, and we had them tag team this. We said go invent a grade of concrete, which has the density to block gamma rays, which has the strength to actually be a concrete block that's self cast, that has no rebar, and that has the right atomic mix that it will not become nuclear waste when it becomes irradiated. And they literally flew all around the country collecting rock samples from all around The United States. Speaker 138:43 - 39:17
我们从团队里找了两位工程师。其中一位是 nuclear physics——抱歉,是 mechanical——准确地说,是一位懂 nuclear physics 的机械工程师;我们让他们两个人搭档来做这件事。我们对他们说:去发明一种混凝土等级,它既要有足够的密度来阻挡 gamma rays,又要有足够的强度,能真正做成一种 self cast(自成型)的混凝土模块,而且不能有 rebar,还要具备合适的 atomic mix(原子组成),这样在受到 irradiation(辐照)后不会变成 nuclear waste。然后他们真的飞遍了全国,从 The United States 各地采集岩石样本。
Speaker 139:17 - 39:36
We called it the rock hunt. It was about a three week period from plane to plane literally collecting bags of rocks, they would come back on a Friday night and they'd set up the conference room with a bunch of buckets of acid and they would dissolve the rocks and then they would take the rocks through a spectroscopy analysis to figure out the exact DPM and then they go back out the next week and collect the next sample. Speaker 139:17 - 39:36
我们把这件事叫作 rock hunt。大概持续了三周,他们真的是一班飞机接一班飞机地跑,收集一袋袋石头;周五晚上回来后,就在会议室里摆上一堆装着酸液的桶,把石头溶解掉,然后再对这些石头做 spectroscopy analysis(光谱分析),以确定精确的 DPM,接着第二周又再出去采集下一批样本。
Speaker 239:38 - 39:39
By the way, Speaker 239:38 - 39:39
顺便说一句,
Speaker 139:39 - 40:15
the two team members are 23 years old and 21 years old respectively and they've done things that the nuclear industry has been dreaming of for literally thirty years. When we unveiled this system for the first time, we got DMs from people who have been in nuclear literally their entire career saying, I've been writing about how someone should do something like this since the 1980s and I've never seen anyone be able to actually pull it off. And that's a really awesome thing about working at Valor. It's also why we get the best talent in the world is because if you are a really, really talented person who cares about nuclear, you wanna see things actually get built. And so you need to go where where you can actually build things. Speaker 139:39 - 40:15
这两位团队成员分别只有 23 岁和 21 岁,但他们做成的事,是整个 nuclear 行业真真切切梦想了三十年的事。我们第一次发布这套系统时,收到了很多私信,来自那些几乎整个职业生涯都在 nuclear 行业里的人,他们说:“从 1980s 起,我就一直在写文章说应该有人做出这样的东西,但我从没见过真的有人能把它做出来。”而这正是在 Valor 工作最棒的一点。这也是为什么我们能吸引到世界上最好的人才:如果你是一个非常、非常有天赋,而且真正在乎 nuclear 的人,你会想看到东西真正被建出来。所以你就得去那些真的能把东西建出来的地方。
Speaker 340:15 - 40:37
You are not a paper and simulation company. You're a nuclear company. But you also seem to be a road building company and a building building company and a concrete pouring company and a rock finding company. So how do you think about, you're very opinionated that, you know, if we must for speed, we will verticalize. How do you think about like having those capabilities and why you make that decision? Speaker 340:15 - 40:37
你们不是一家只做 paper 和 simulation 的公司。你们是一家 nuclear 公司。但你们看起来同时又像是一家修路公司、一家盖楼公司、一家浇筑混凝土的公司,还是一家找石头的公司。所以你怎么看这个问题?你们的立场很明确:为了速度,只要有必要,我们就会 verticalize(垂直整合)。你怎么看待拥有这些能力,以及为什么会做出这样的决定?
Speaker 240:37 - 41:14
Yeah. I mean, this is the secret weapon of valor, and I'm gonna give you the secret weapon because I fully believe that no one will be able to copy us in this. We are willing to verticalize anything that is necessary on our path to scale, And we've proven that a couple times in this in this reactor so far in areas that we were told repeatedly was utterly impossible. And the fact is, like, when a problem is important enough, you can go solve it, and you can verticalize it. Because when a problem is as important as making energy cheap, you can go get the most talented people in the world to come and help you solve that problem. Speaker 240:37 - 41:14
对。我的意思是,这就是 Valor 的秘密武器,而我现在就把这个秘密武器告诉你,因为我完全相信,没有人能在这一点上复制我们。只要是在我们通往 scale(规模化)路径上必要的东西,我们都愿意去 verticalize。到目前为止,在这座 reactor(反应堆)项目里,我们已经在几个领域证明了这一点,而那些领域,别人曾一再告诉我们,那是彻底不可能做到的。事实就是,当一个问题足够重要时,你就能去把它解决掉,也能把它 verticalize。因为当一个问题重要到像“让能源变便宜”这种程度时,你就能把全世界最有才华的人找来,帮助你一起解决这个问题。
Speaker 241:14 - 41:24
Right? You can assemble the brightest minds to tackle it. You can get the best capital formation who who helps you go and and acquire the resources necessary. And it's really a mindset thing. You know? Speaker 241:14 - 41:24
对吧?你可以把最聪明的一群人组织起来攻克它。你也可以获得最好的 capital formation(资本组织能力)支持,帮助你获取所需的资源。归根结底,这其实是一种 mindset(思维方式),你知道吗?
Speaker 241:24 - 41:59
We've talked to and and know many of the most talented nuclear engineers in the world. And what we keep finding over and over is, yes, there are amazing designs, but not much has actually been physically built. And if you have the muscle as a company to build things in the physical world, if you know how to do fundamental clean sheet design all the way through to prototyping, testing, and manufacturing, you have an edge, right, that that nobody else has in nuclear today. And so we look at really anything in the stack, And it's not that we want to verticalize everything. We'd prefer that most of the plants commoditize. Speaker 241:24 - 41:59
我们接触过、也认识世界上许多最有才华的 nuclear engineers。我们反复发现的一点是:没错,出色的设计确实很多,但真正被实际建造出来的并不多。而如果一家公司有能力在物理世界里把东西造出来,如果你知道怎样从根本性的 clean sheet design(白纸设计)一路做到 prototyping(原型开发)、testing(测试)和 manufacturing(制造),那你就拥有了如今 nuclear 领域别人没有的优势。所以我们会看整条 stack(技术栈)里几乎任何一层;倒不是说我们想把一切都 verticalize(垂直整合),我们其实更希望大多数工厂环节都能 commoditize(商品化)。
Speaker 241:59 - 42:05
Right? In theory, it'd be great if we could just buy a kit. Right? Like, if I if anyone is selling a nuclear reactor kit, I'm a buyer. Right? Speaker 241:59 - 42:05
对吧?理论上,如果我们能直接买一套 kit,那就太好了。对吧?如果有人在卖 nuclear reactor kit,我就是买家。
Speaker 242:05 - 42:07
I'm gonna go staple together, and I'm gonna make energy, and that's great. Speaker 242:05 - 42:07
我把它们钉在一起装好,然后就能产能,这不是很好吗。
Speaker 342:07 - 42:08
You're just gonna make lots of plants. Speaker 342:07 - 42:08
你就是要大规模地建很多工厂。
Speaker 242:08 - 42:30
Exactly. You know, that's not how it works. In in in actuality, there are a lot of these components that are wildly overpriced that have super constrained supplies. And a fundamental edge that Valor has is that we know we are competent to verticalize any individual piece of that that prevents scale. And once we identify that, we attack it ruthlessly. Speaker 242:08 - 42:30
没错。你知道,现实根本不是这么运作的。实际情况是,这里面有很多组件价格高得离谱,而且供应极其受限。Valor 的一个根本优势在于:凡是阻碍规模化的任何单个环节,我们都知道自己有能力把它 verticalize(垂直整合)进去。一旦识别出这样的环节,我们就会毫不留情地解决它。
Speaker 342:30 - 42:39
And you don't think any piece of it is, like, you know, intersecting with more regulatory pain, too complicated for you to figure out, like, I think about your fuel supply chain, Speaker 342:30 - 42:39
你不觉得其中某些部分——比如说——会带来更多 regulatory pain(监管阻力),复杂到你们也很难搞定吗?比如我想到你们的 fuel supply chain(燃料供应链),
Speaker 242:39 - 42:46
for example. Definitely intersecting with regulatory pain. Right. And, like, we run at that pain. Like, we just run toward gunfire on the most complicated things every time. Speaker 242:39 - 42:46
举个例子,当然会碰上 regulatory pain。对。我们就是迎着那种痛点冲上去。每一次,越是最复杂的事情,我们越是像迎着枪火往前冲。
Speaker 242:46 - 43:16
We're two and a half years, three and a half know, three years into this company, and we've done something that no other nuclear startup has ever done, which is make nuclear power. And it it comes from this fundamental mindset that the teams that the team has, which is, yes, there are complexities in regulation. Yes, this is hard, you know, equipment to manufacture. Yes. It's difficult to do both of those at the same time where you have complex equipment and regulation and construction and rock hunting and pouring concrete and building buildings. Speaker 242:46 - 43:16
这家公司成立到现在两年半、三年半——嗯,三年左右——我们已经做成了一件其他任何 nuclear startup 都从未做到过的事,那就是发出了 nuclear power(核电)。这背后来自团队一种根本性的思维方式:没错,监管上有复杂性;没错,这些设备很难制造;没错,当复杂设备、监管、施工、地勘选址以及浇筑混凝土、建造建筑物这些事情同时叠加时,难度确实很高。
Speaker 243:16 - 43:57
But the company that figures out how to do all of that complexity at scale and at pace is going to win. And, you know, we're sitting here right now, you know, less than three years from the founding of the company, and I think if you look back at ten years, in ten years from now and, you know, Valor's worth 500,000,000,000, something like that, you will be able to see that through line where we took the hardest parts of nuclear, right, which is the site, right, and the regulatory and the fuel supply chain and the instrumentation and the shielding and all these things that everyone tries to outsource. And we said, actually, we're gonna become masters of that. Right? And we're gonna go hire the best people in the world to tackle that, and that becomes our edge and in the actual manufacturing. Speaker 243:16 - 43:57
但那家能够把所有这些复杂性以规模化、并且以足够快的速度做出来的公司,最终会赢。你知道,我们现在坐在这里,距离公司创立还不到三年;我想,如果你在十年后回头看,到了那时,如果 Valor 的价值达到 500,000,000,000,差不多这个量级,你就能看清那条清晰的发展主线:我们接手了 nuclear(核能)里最难的部分,对吧,比如 site(选址)、regulatory(监管)、fuel supply chain(燃料供应链)、instrumentation(仪表与测量)、shielding(屏蔽)以及所有这些别人都试图外包出去的事情。而我们说,事实上,我们要成为这些领域的大师。对吧?我们要去招募世界上最好的人来解决这些问题,而这会成为我们的优势,也会体现在实际制造中。
Speaker 143:57 - 44:12
This is another really good example of makes what makes Valor unique. This is our control skin. These three boxes right there are basically a analog to digital electronics box. So Speaker 143:57 - 44:12
这又是一个非常好的例子,说明了是什么让 Valor 如此独特。这是我们的 control skin。这边这三个盒子,基本上就是一种 analog to digital electronics box(模数电子盒)。所以
Speaker 244:12 - 44:13
if you Speaker 244:12 - 44:13
如果你
Speaker 144:13 - 44:24
know anything about electronic circuitry, it's pretty simple stuff. You've got some signal amplifiers. You have some basic rectifiers in there. And and basically we take some analog signals from Speaker 144:13 - 44:24
对 electronic circuitry(电子电路)稍微了解一点,这其实是很简单的东西。里面有一些 signal amplifiers(信号放大器),也有一些基本的 rectifiers(整流器)。基本上,我们把一些 analog signals(模拟信号)从
Speaker 244:24 - 44:26
our our detectors and we Speaker 244:24 - 44:26
我们的 detectors(探测器)中取出来,然后我们
Speaker 144:26 - 44:40
send them to the control room. Each one of those boxes cost $450,000. This is when it when anyone talks to you about like cost and nuclear like oh nuclear is expensive. They are talking about ridiculous things like this. Right? Speaker 144:26 - 44:40
把它们发送到 control room(控制室)。这几个盒子每一个都要花 $450,000。这就是为什么当有人跟你谈成本、谈 nuclear,说“哦,nuclear 很贵”时,他们说的其实就是这种离谱的东西。对吧?
Speaker 144:40 - 45:05
And this is really where Valor's gonna win. That we accepted the $450,000 cost on this one because we're moving really fast, you know, and spending a million and a half dollars for these three boxes was more worthwhile to us than taking a couple months of delay. But this box over here, totally different story. This one, it was fit out at $5,000,000. They told us that it was gonna cost $5,000,000 to buy that box right there. Speaker 144:40 - 45:05
而这也正是 Valor 将要胜出的地方。对于这一项,我们接受了 $450,000 的成本,因为我们推进得非常快;对我们来说,花 $1,500,000 买这三个盒子,也比耽误几个月更值得。但这边这个盒子,就完全是另一回事了。这个盒子的报价是 $5,000,000。他们告诉我们,光买那边那个盒子就要 $5,000,000。
Speaker 145:05 - 45:25
That is our, what's called reactor protection system, RPS. This is basically the brain of the reactor. This system right here is super unique. It has no human input. It's basically a self deterministic machine that decides whether or not the plant is in a safe state. Speaker 145:05 - 45:25
那就是我们所谓的 reactor protection system,RPS。这基本上就是反应堆的大脑。这个系统非常独特。它没有任何 human input(人工输入)。它本质上是一台 self deterministic machine(自我确定机器),负责判断整个 plant(电厂)是否处于安全状态。
Speaker 145:25 - 45:39
So it has three different sections of boat against itself to say is the plant in a safe state or not. And if two of them boat that the plant is not in a safe state, it shuts down. And we were quoted about $5,000,000, and we were told it would take it would take about two and a Speaker 145:25 - 45:39
所以,它有三个彼此独立的判断通道,用来判定这个 plant 是否处于安全状态。如果其中有两个通道判定 plant 不安全,它就会停机。而对方给我们的报价大约是 $5,000,000,并且告诉我们,这大概需要两年半
Speaker 245:39 - 45:40
half years to build. Speaker 245:39 - 45:40
才能建好。
Speaker 145:42 - 46:03
And so we said, well, alright. Maybe I'd be willing to pay $5,000,000, but I'm certainly not gonna wait two and a half years. And so after having haggled with this vendor for about two months trying to convince him to go faster, we eventually got the team together and said, we're gonna have to build our own RPS. And we sat down with Joe, who runs instrumentation and control. Awesome guy. Speaker 145:42 - 46:03
于是我们说,好吧。也许我愿意付 $5,000,000,但我肯定不愿意等两年半。于是,在和这个 vendor 来回扯了大约两个月、试图说服他们加快进度之后,我们最终把团队召集起来,说,我们得自己做一个 RPS。然后我们和负责 instrumentation and control 的 Joe 坐下来聊了这件事。他人非常棒。
Speaker 146:03 - 46:30
Brown dropout. Really, really good with electronics, and he brought together five team members and locked ourselves in the conference room. And six weeks later, we had a a working RPS, and we spent about $400,000 on it. Everywhere in nuclear is like this, there are totally fake costs from an industry that is just totally anemic. It doesn't know how to build anything anymore. Speaker 146:03 - 46:30
Brown dropout。电子方面真的、真的非常厉害。他召集了五名团队成员,我们把自己关进会议室。六周之后,我们就做出了一个可运行的 RPS,而且总共只花了大约 $400,000。nuclear 行业到处都是这种情况:成本完全是虚高的,这个行业已经彻底萎靡了,已经不知道该怎么造东西了。
Speaker 146:30 - 47:11
By the way, the conclusion to that story is kind of unfortunate, which is that when the vendor realized that we're gonna do it ourselves because we just could not, you know, get our heads around a two year timeline, they freaked out and started telling everybody in the industry that we're an unsafe company that's gonna kill people because we would dare to to do something ourselves that, you know, is there a special sauce that they're charging the market $5,000,000 for? And if you go to I don't know if you guys use any of these, like, investor search platforms where you can, like, go look up a company and people have done, like, expert calls. They contacted all of those expert calls companies and volunteered to do an expert call on Valor where their CTO Speaker 146:30 - 47:11
顺便说一句,这个故事的结局其实有点不幸:当那个 vendor 意识到我们要自己做,因为我们实在无法接受两年的时间线时,他们慌了,开始到处跟业内的人说我们是一家不安全的公司,会害死人——就因为我们竟然敢自己做这件事。怎么,他们收市场 $5,000,000,难道这里面真有什么 special sauce 吗?而且如果你们会用那类 investor search platform,就是那种你可以去查公司、还能看到别人做过 expert call 的平台,他们联系了所有这些 expert call 公司,主动提出要做一通关于 Valor 的 expert call,而他们的 CTO
Speaker 347:11 - 47:12
shitty. Speaker 347:11 - 47:12
烂透了。
Speaker 147:12 - 47:37
Yeah. Their CTO basically went and, like, ranted about how we're the worst company on earth because this is a massive, massive threat to them. The fact that their $5,000,000 system, we can just make for a couple $100 with a team of five engineers. But the more that you look at a nuclear, the more it's like this. Everywhere you look, it's a fake industry that has not been building anything for forty years, and the little bit that they have been building, they're charging up 100 x margin on. Speaker 147:12 - 47:37
对,他们的 CTO 基本上就是到处大骂,说我们是地球上最糟糕的公司,因为这对他们构成了巨大的、巨大的威胁。毕竟他们那个价值 $5,000,000 的系统,我们一个五人工程师团队花几十万美元就能做出来。但你越深入看 nuclear 行业,就越会发现到处都是这样。放眼望去,这是一个四十年来几乎什么都没建成的虚假行业,而就算他们确实做出了一点东西,也要加上 100 x 的利润率来卖。
Speaker 147:37 - 47:45
But if you just take it from first principles and you have smart people in the room and you're willing to build it yourself, you end up with this, and the plant is running. Speaker 147:37 - 47:45
但如果你从 first principles(第一性原理)出发,让聪明的人坐在一个房间里,并且愿意自己动手去造,最后你就会得到这样的结果,而且这个 plant 现在已经在运行了。
Speaker 347:46 - 47:58
There is something very inspiring about the idea of, like, given the physics work Yeah. It should be possible. Absolutely. And if it is possible to do faster here, the best people will come and the capital will come. Speaker 347:46 - 47:58
这个想法非常鼓舞人心:既然 physics(物理规律)已经被验证——对,理论上应该可行,绝对如此——那么如果这件事能在这里更快做成,最优秀的人才就会来,资本也会来。
Speaker 247:58 - 47:59
Exactly. Speaker 247:58 - 47:59
完全正确。
Speaker 348:00 - 48:22
This is an expensive project as far as I can tell. How do you think about the fact that the you're an equity finance venture backed company today. How how do you think about the fact that the, like, debt vehicles, project financing, operational proof of this doesn't really exist in the ecosystem to, you know, perhaps support as much scale as you'd like, as quickly as you'd like? Speaker 348:00 - 48:22
据我所知,这是一项很烧钱的项目。你如何看待这样一个现实:你们今天是一家由 equity finance(股权融资)和 venture-backed(风投支持)的公司;而 debt vehicles(债务融资工具)、project financing(项目融资),以及这类项目所需的 operational proof(运营层面的验证)在这个生态里其实并不存在,至少还不足以按你们希望的规模、按你们希望的速度来提供支持?
Speaker 248:22 - 48:41
Yeah. So this is actually one of the things that I noticed years before starting the company. The the sort of traditional plan for nuclear startup is you try to do some engineering and some design and some customer LOIs, MOUs, and you try to assemble this package. And it's a it's essentially paper. Right? Speaker 248:22 - 48:41
对。所以这其实是我在创办公司好多年前就注意到的一件事。nuclear startup(核能创业公司)的传统打法,大概就是先做一些 engineering(工程)、一些 design(设计),再拿一些客户 LOIs(意向书)、MOUs(谅解备忘录),然后试着把这一整套材料拼起来。而说到底,这本质上就是一套纸面方案,对吧?
Speaker 248:41 - 49:04
But it's a package that's attractive enough to get somebody to come and fund the project. Right? That's the essential plan of all nuclear startups. They want to convince a debt financer or a project financer or something like that to fund their nice paper package of designs and partnerships. I went into this company believing that and by the way, I believe that that was possible, like, ten years ago. Speaker 248:41 - 49:04
但这套方案要足够有吸引力,才能让某个人愿意出钱资助这个项目,对吧?这基本上就是所有 nuclear startups 的核心路径:他们想说服 debt financer(债务出资方)或者 project financer(项目融资方)之类的人,为他们这套漂亮的纸面设计和合作关系买单。我最初创办这家公司时也是这么想的——顺便说一句,我相信大概在十年前,这条路确实是行得通的。
Speaker 349:04 - 49:05
Mhmm. Speaker 249:05 - 49:31
And after watching this fail over and over and over in other startups, I came into this company knowing we're not gonna do that. One of the unique advantages that The United States has is a risk on equity capital environment. Right? And the type of risk that we are asking investors to take is we know the physics works. We know that there's infinite demand, and how we go from here to there is technology execution. Speaker 249:05 - 49:31
但在看到其他 startups 一次又一次这样失败之后,我创办这家公司时就已经很清楚:我们不会这么做。The United States 的一个独特优势,就是它拥有一个 risk-on(愿意承担风险)的 equity capital(股权资本)环境,对吧?而我们要求投资人承担的这种风险是:我们知道 physics 是成立的,我们知道需求几乎是无限的,接下来从这里走到落地,中间真正要解决的是 technology execution(技术执行)问题。
Speaker 249:32 - 49:48
And guess what? Venture capital in The United States is the best at underwriting tech risk of anywhere in the world. Right? That is how Silicon Valley has come to be what it is. That is how venture capital has come to, you know, eat as much of of finance as it has is that venture capitalists know how to underwrite technical risk. Speaker 249:32 - 49:48
而且你知道吗?The United States 的 venture capital(风险投资)最擅长的,就是为 tech risk(技术风险)做 underwriting(风险评估与定价),这一点全球无出其右,对吧?Silicon Valley 之所以会成为今天的样子,原因就在这里。venture capital 之所以能在金融领域吃下这么大一块份额,也正是因为 venture capitalists(风险投资人)懂得如何评估技术风险。
Speaker 249:49 - 49:59
And it's execution and it's you know, when we say tech, we're not talking about physics. We're not talking about science. We're talking about mechanical engineering. We're talking about thermal hydraulics. We're talking about instrumentation, right, manufacturing methods. Speaker 249:49 - 49:59
而这里的问题是 execution(执行)——而且我们说 tech 的时候,不是在说 physics,不是在说 science(科学原理),我们说的是 mechanical engineering(机械工程)、thermal hydraulics(热工水力)、instrumentation(仪器仪表与控制),对吧,还有 manufacturing methods(制造方法)。
Speaker 249:59 - 50:24
These are it's complicated. It's nuclear, but it's, like, significantly less complicated than a rocket engine, for example. So, you know, I think this is one of our our fundamental edges and advantages is that we're risk on about this, and we have a cap table that's that's risk on about this. We are willing to go build reactors on equity balance sheet because that's going to allow us to prove it years ahead of anybody else. Right? Speaker 249:59 - 50:24
这些事情当然复杂,毕竟这是 nuclear,但比如说,它显然还是比 rocket engine(火箭发动机)要简单得多。所以我认为,这正是我们最根本的 edge(优势)之一:我们对这件事采取的是 risk-on 的态度,而我们的 cap table(股权结构)也是 risk-on 的。我们愿意用 equity balance sheet(股权资产负债表)直接去建 reactors(反应堆),因为这样能让我们比任何人都提前好多年把它真正验证出来,对吧?
Speaker 250:24 - 50:50
Where where our competitors are still trying to convince, you know, fundamentally risk averse, you know, financers to to finance a project, we will be on our fifth reactor. Right? And after five reactors well, actually, now project finance is an option. Right? Now debt is an option, but it's an only an option once those early backers have put the capital in the ground, demonstrated it, and that becomes an enormous moat that's frankly gonna be impossible to beat. Speaker 250:24 - 50:50
当我们的竞争对手还在试图说服那些从根本上就厌恶风险的资方为一个项目提供融资时,我们这边已经会做到第五座 reactor(反应堆)了。对吧?而在有了五座 reactor 之后,项目融资才真正成为一种选择。对吧?这时债务融资也成为一种选择,但这只会在那些早期支持者先把资本投进项目、把它验证出来之后才成立,而这会形成一道巨大的 moat(护城河),坦白说,别人几乎不可能击败。
Speaker 350:50 - 51:16
One of the more different things that you've decided to do here is, you know, try to build your own plant independently and bring customers to it as, you know, at much scale as possible in a gigasite. Right? And, you know, part of the belief there is like, well, if I can provide power at scale and especially cheap power, like the load will come to me. Yes. Many things. Speaker 350:50 - 51:16
你们在这里决定做的一件更不一样的事,是试图独立建设自己的 plant(工厂/电站),并以尽可能大的规模、在一个 gigasite(超大园区)里把客户吸引过来。对吧?而其中一部分逻辑是:如果我能大规模提供电力,尤其是便宜的电力,那么负载需求自然会来找我。对,很多事情都是这样。
Speaker 351:17 - 51:22
You know, can you describe like the rationale behind that strategy? Speaker 351:17 - 51:22
你能讲讲这种策略背后的 rationale(逻辑依据)吗?
Speaker 251:22 - 51:35
Yeah. Yeah. It comes from a very similar argument that I was making before where I'd watched startups try to get that deal right for a very long time. And frankly, there are just too many parties. Right? Speaker 251:22 - 51:35
可以,可以。这来自一个和我刚才非常类似的论点:我看过很多 startup(初创公司)花了很长时间去试图把那种交易谈成。但坦白说,牵涉的参与方实在太多了。对吧?
Speaker 251:35 - 51:37
There are, like, too many people and too many parties And Speaker 251:35 - 51:37
就是说,人太多了,相关方也太多了。而且
Speaker 351:37 - 51:40
how's your speed to be like, well, let's negotiate about this site and this permit? Speaker 351:37 - 51:40
你的推进速度怎么可能快得起来呢?因为总得陷在“好,那我们来谈谈这个 site(场址)和这个 permit(许可)吧”这种事情里。
Speaker 251:40 - 51:49
Exactly. Like, yes. In theory, could we go to know, hyperscaler who wants a gigawatt of power in a place? Like, yes. And and certainly, we will at some point. Speaker 251:40 - 51:49
没错。理论上说,我们能不能去找一个想在某个地方拿到 1 gigawatt 电力的 hyperscaler(超大规模云服务商)?当然可以。而且可以肯定的是,我们在某个时间点一定会这么做。
Speaker 251:49 - 52:08
But we can also just put a gigawatt on the ground. Right? And we can do that on our own timing at our own pace, and that pace is going to be faster than anyone else in the world. And and the question flips around, which is if I have, you know, a gigawatt of power with land and fiber, is someone gonna put a data center there? It's like, yes. Speaker 251:49 - 52:08
但我们也完全可以先自己把 1 gigawatt 的电力直接落地。对吧?而且我们可以按照自己的时间表、自己的节奏来做,而这个节奏会比世界上任何其他人都快。这样一来,问题就反过来了:如果我手上有 1 gigawatt 的电力,还有土地和 fiber(光纤),那会不会有人把 data center(数据中心)建在那里?答案就是:会。
Speaker 252:08 - 52:29
Absolutely. Right? And so, yeah, I think, like, in the long term, we'll maybe start to do some of these deals where a dedicated customer wants their own giga site for their hyper cluster or something like that, but it'll be driven by speed even in that case. Right? We'll go to the customers who say, you know, and we want it delivered in a year. Speaker 252:08 - 52:29
当然。对吧?所以,是的,我觉得从长期来看,我们可能会开始做一些这样的交易:某个专门客户希望为他们的 hyper cluster 单独配一个自己的 giga site 之类的,但即便在那种情况下,驱动因素也仍然会是速度。对吧?我们会去找那些说“你知道的,我们希望它在一年内交付”的客户。
Speaker 252:29 - 52:42
Right? Not the customers who say, oh, we're thinking about this in three to four years. So really speed and scale. If you honestly, if you ask me any question and you keep digging back, you will find speed and scale. Like, that really is what nuclear is missing. Speaker 252:29 - 52:42
对吧?而不是那些说“哦,我们考虑的是三到四年后”的客户。所以归根结底就是速度和规模。如果你真的问我任何问题,然后一路往回深挖,你最后都会发现答案是速度和规模。就像,nuclear 真正缺的就是这个。
Speaker 252:42 - 52:57
It's missing its its Ford moment. It's Toyota moment. It's SpaceX moment where you have a company that realizes that the actual thing that nuclear is missing is scale deployment. And and that's really what we care about. And so the giga site and we've got a site here. Speaker 252:42 - 52:57
它缺少的是属于自己的 Ford 时刻、Toyota 时刻、SpaceX 时刻——也就是出现这样一家公司:它意识到 nuclear 真正缺失的东西,其实是规模化部署。而这也正是我们真正关心的。所以说到 giga site,我们这里已经有一个 site。
Speaker 252:57 - 53:09
We're gonna build more reactors here. We have a a planned giga site nearby. We get to go with conviction, build power. And, I'm absolutely confident that load will follow. Speaker 252:57 - 53:09
我们会在这里建更多 reactors(反应堆)。我们在附近还有一个规划中的 giga site。我们可以带着足够的确定性推进,先把 power(电力)建出来。而我绝对相信,load(负荷需求)会随之而来。
Speaker 353:10 - 53:14
How do you if you just think of your primary objectives as speed and scale Speaker 353:10 - 53:14
如果你把自己的首要目标简单理解为速度和规模,
Speaker 153:14 - 53:15
Yes. Speaker 353:15 - 53:24
Given safety. Right? How do you, like, drive that personally as CEO? What do you wake up every day and, like, think about problems to solve or what to focus on? Speaker 353:15 - 53:24
前提是 safety(安全)。对吧?作为 CEO,你会怎样亲自推动这件事?你每天醒来时会想些什么——要解决哪些问题,或者该把注意力放在哪里?
Speaker 253:24 - 53:33
Yeah. This is one of those things that I think is the probably the most irreplaceable attribute of a company is its internal pace. We call it tick rate. Speaker 253:24 - 53:33
对,这是那种我认为可能是公司最不可替代的属性之一的东西:它的内部节奏。我们把它叫作 tick rate。
Speaker 353:33 - 53:33
Mhmm. Speaker 253:33 - 54:03
That's a sort of a metric that we've designed around going critical in in new systems, but you could probably translate that to any industry. You know, in software, it's probably something like, you know, new, continuous integration builds per hour or something like that. But, I think it's the hardest thing to replicate. You have to start it from the first day of the company. It has to come from the CEO, and the first five team members have to have it deep in their bones. Speaker 253:33 - 54:03
这是一个我们围绕新系统达到 going critical(临界启动)而设计出的某种指标,不过你大概也可以把它翻译到任何行业里。比如在 software(软件)里,它可能类似于“每小时新增的 continuous integration(持续集成)构建次数”之类的东西。不过,我认为这是最难复制的东西。你必须从公司成立第一天就开始建立它。它必须来自 CEO,而且最初的五名团队成员必须把它深深刻进骨子里。
Speaker 254:03 - 54:22
The first 20 team members have to have it deep in their bones. They have to be trained that when they hire people, they're looking for that in their you know, in those people's bones, And that's also not enough. Also, once you're in that setup, I have to constantly and I this is really what I do, go around the organization and speed things up. Right? You know, continuously ask. Speaker 254:03 - 54:22
最初的 20 名团队成员,必须把这件事刻进骨子里。他们必须被训练成:当他们招聘别人时,也是在看这种东西是不是也刻在那些人的骨子里。而这还不够。因为一旦进入那种组织设置里,我还得持续不断地——而这确实就是我在做的事——在整个组织里到处推进,把速度提起来。对吧?就是不断地追问。
Speaker 254:23 - 54:32
My two step's laughing over here because she's seen this happen many times. You know, I go I go war mode on things. Right? So, like, look around and, like, okay. That's going slow. Speaker 254:23 - 54:32
我旁边的 My two step 正在笑,因为她已经很多次见过这种情况了。你知道,我会进入 war mode(战时模式)来处理事情。对吧?所以,就是四处看看,然后说,嗯,这件事太慢了。
Speaker 254:32 - 54:46
And we will we will set up a a literal war room, and I guess not literal war room, but we'll set up a physical war room, and we will say, how do we turn a six month timeline into a four week timeline? Right? And maybe we'll hit eight weeks. Right? But it's not six months. Speaker 254:32 - 54:46
然后我们会设立一个真正的 war room,不过我猜也不算字面意义上的 war room,但我们会设立一个实体的 war room,然后我们会问:怎么把六个月的时间表压缩成四周?对吧?也许最后我们做到的是八周。对吧?但肯定不是六个月。
Speaker 254:47 - 55:00
And I I think I've realized, like, there is no autopilot for that. There's no automatic mode that makes a company faster inherently. There are lots of things you can do to set it up for success. But Speaker 254:47 - 55:00
而且我想我已经意识到了一点:这件事没有 autopilot(自动驾驶)可言。没有什么自动模式会让一家公司天然变得更快。你当然可以做很多事,让它更有成功的条件。但是
Speaker 355:00 - 55:01
But you have to push. Speaker 355:00 - 55:01
但你必须去推。
Speaker 255:01 - 55:15
You will always I will always have to push, and I will always push. And it's because I know that the physics are here. Right? I know that energy will be a thousand times cheaper than it is today. I know that nuclear fission will make energy a thousand times cheaper than it is today. Speaker 255:01 - 55:15
你总是得推,我总是得推,而且我也会一直推。因为我知道这里面的 physics(客观规律)是存在的。对吧?我知道,能源的成本会比今天低一千倍。我知道,nuclear fission(核裂变)会让能源成本比今天低一千倍。
Speaker 255:15 - 55:36
Somebody will do that. And it's really up to us as a team whether or not that's gonna be in the future decades or the future centuries because that time is up to us. Right? It's up to us how quickly we go down that path, how quickly we make energy more abundant, and that feeds into everything else. So it's it's highly motivating for us, and we are are tackling it as fast as we can. Speaker 255:15 - 55:36
总会有人把这件事做成。而作为一个团队,未来是在几十年后实现,还是在几个世纪后实现,真的取决于我们,因为那个时间尺度是由我们决定的。对吧?我们沿着这条路走得多快,我们让能源变得更丰富的速度有多快,这一切都取决于我们,而这又会影响其他所有事情。所以这对我们来说是极具激励作用的,我们也正以自己能做到的最快速度去攻克它。
Speaker 355:36 - 55:47
People in their daily lives thinking about what happens for them if this works and get very cheap abundant nuclear energy. Like, imagine that future for us. Speaker 355:36 - 55:47
人们在日常生活里会去想,如果这件事成功了,如果我们拥有极其廉价且充足的 nuclear energy(核能),那对他们意味着什么。就想象一下,那会是一个怎样的未来。
Speaker 255:48 - 56:20
Energy is the fundamental input to the quality of human life. If you look backward into time and say, how did humanity go from one standard of living to the next? It's always unlocked by cheaper energy. Right? So when we went from essentially a solar powered world, which is what we were in agrarian age, like, literally human muscles were solar powered because you were either eating plants or eating animals, and both of those things were essentially chemical energy that is built up by the energy of the sun through photosynthesis. Speaker 255:48 - 56:20
能源是决定人类生活质量的基础性投入。如果你回头看历史,问一句:人类是如何从一种生活水平跃升到下一种生活水平的?答案总是由更便宜的能源来解锁。对吧?所以,当我们从一个本质上由太阳供能的世界走来——也就是农业时代的状态——说得更字面一点,人的肌肉也是由太阳供能的,因为你要么吃植物,要么吃动物,而这两者本质上都是通过光合作用由太阳能积累起来的化学能。
Speaker 256:20 - 56:41
Life was hard. Right? Life was really, really hard. When we got into underground hydrocarbons, you had this massive explosion of quality of life, right, where we have, you know, heat in the winter and we have AC in the summer, where we're able to drive cars to get to the hospital. Even really simple things. Speaker 256:20 - 56:41
那时生活很艰难。对吧?生活真的、真的非常艰难。等我们开始利用地下的 hydrocarbons(碳氢化合物)之后,生活质量就出现了巨大的爆发式提升,对吧?我们冬天有暖气,夏天有 AC(空调),我们可以开车去医院。哪怕是这些非常简单的事情也是如此。
Speaker 256:41 - 57:04
You know, we're in a an aluminum strut building right now. Every one of these these struts that you could see behind us are made of aluminum. There was a time when aluminum was considered a precious metal, where kings would literally make jewelry out of aluminum because it was that rare. And the thing that changed it to a literally structural metal that we'd make buildings out of, is energy becoming cheaper. Right? Speaker 256:41 - 57:04
你看,我们现在就在一栋有 aluminum(铝)支撑杆的建筑里。你在我们身后看到的每一根支撑杆都是 aluminum 制成的。曾经有一段时间,aluminum 被视为一种贵金属,国王们真的会用 aluminum 来制作珠宝,因为它稀有到那种程度。而让它从一种珍贵金属变成如今我们用来盖楼的结构金属的原因,就是能源变得更便宜了。对吧?
Speaker 257:04 - 57:34
We figured out you know, Charles Hall here in The United States figured out aluminum electrolysis, and cheap enough energy means that you can actually just separate that oxide from the aluminum, and you can have pure aluminum metal. And that is that is entirely downstream of of energy. So I would say that the standard of living that we enjoy today is entirely downstream of the fact that we figured out you can make pretty cheap energy with hydrocarbons. Now our goal is not pretty cheap energy. It's insanely cheap energy, and that's gonna be unlocked by by nuclear. Speaker 257:04 - 57:34
我们后来搞明白了——在 The United States,这里的 Charles Hall 发明了 aluminum 电解法——而足够便宜的能源意味着你实际上可以把氧化物中的氧和 aluminum 分离开,从而得到纯 aluminum 金属。而这一切,完全都是能源带来的下游结果。所以我会说,我们今天享受的生活水平,完全是因为我们发现可以用 hydrocarbons 制造相当便宜的能源。现在我们的目标已经不是“相当便宜”的能源了,而是便宜得离谱的能源,而这将由 nuclear(核能)来解锁。
Speaker 257:34 - 57:54
What it will look like, I think, is fundamentally unpredictable, but I I have a few ideas. First of all, I'm very, very excited about transportation. Like, if you think about the fundamental limits of why is it that I can't go see grandma every week, you know, on a plane? Like, why is it just so hard to do? Why is it so expensive? Speaker 257:34 - 57:54
我认为那会是什么样子,从根本上说是不可预测的,不过我确实有几个想法。首先,我对交通运输非常、非常兴奋。比如说,如果你去想一个根本性的限制:为什么我不能每周都坐飞机去看 grandma?比如,为什么这件事就是这么难做到?为什么这么贵?
Speaker 257:54 - 58:15
Why is it so complicated? It really just comes down to the fact that we've kinda squeezed as much juice out of jet fuel as we can. Right? It's just hard to imagine jet fuel getting 10 times cheaper than it is today, and it's polluting the environment and all of these different things. If you could make energy 10 times cheaper, then you probably could go visit grandma every other day. Speaker 257:54 - 58:15
为什么这么复杂?归根结底,其实就是因为我们已经差不多把 jet fuel(航空燃油)的潜力压榨到极限了。对吧?很难想象 jet fuel 的价格还能比今天再便宜 10 倍,而且它还会污染环境,以及诸如此类的各种问题。如果你能把能源成本做到便宜 10 倍,那么你大概就能隔一天去看一次 grandma。
Speaker 258:15 - 58:28
You know, just on a on a Saturday, it takes thirty minutes, and, you know, she lives across the country, but you you go and visit her on the weekend. I'm very excited about what I would call hyper techno industrialism. This is a term I invented for Okay. Speaker 258:15 - 58:28
比如就在某个周六,花三十分钟——你知道,她住在国家另一头——但你周末就能飞过去看她。我还非常期待我所说的 hyper techno industrialism。这是我自己创造的一个词。好。
Speaker 358:28 - 58:29
Haven't heard it. Speaker 358:28 - 58:29
还没听过这个词。
Speaker 258:29 - 58:45
Yeah. For basically everything becoming free. It it this sounds like I'm I'm talking sci fi here, but, like, an approximation of this will happen. I'm let me put out a thought experiment for you. So let's take a a physical good that's manufactured today. Speaker 258:29 - 58:45
对,基本上就是一切都会变得免费。这听起来像是我在讲 sci-fi(科幻),但类似情况的一个近似版本确实会发生。我给你做个思想实验。我们先拿一种今天制造出来的实体商品来看。
Speaker 258:45 - 58:57
Right? Let's let's take this microphone. So this microphone came from a factory, and the factory had sort of three inputs. Right? It had people in the factory that are working on it, assembling things. Speaker 258:45 - 58:57
对吧?我们就拿这个麦克风来说。这个麦克风来自一家工厂,而这家工厂大致有三种投入。对吧?第一是工厂里的人,他们在工作、在组装东西。
Speaker 258:58 - 59:13
It had input materials. Right? And I would include in those input materials, you know, the plastic on here and this foam thing, also the machines, right, that, you know, maybe injection molded that plastic. And then the last thing it consumed was energy. Right? Speaker 258:58 - 59:13
第二是投入材料。对吧?这里的投入材料包括,你知道,这上面的塑料和这个泡沫套,也包括机器,对吧?比如那些可能用注塑方式做出这部分塑料的机器。然后它消耗的最后一样东西是能源。对吧?
Speaker 259:13 - 59:36
So energy is one of the three things that made this. What's interesting is with the introduction of AI, we're actually converting the human input element to energy. Right? So instead of, a person having to pick something up and put it onto the next tray, right, you're going to have a robot pick something up, put on onto the next tray, and consume energy. Right? Speaker 259:13 - 59:36
所以,能源是制造它的三种要素之一。有意思的是,随着 AI 的引入,我们实际上是在把人类投入这一项转化为能源。对吧?也就是说,不再是一个人必须把某个东西拿起来再放到下一个托盘上,而是会由机器人把东西拿起来,放到下一个托盘上,并消耗能源。对吧?
Speaker 259:36 - 59:54
And instead, that human will be able to coordinate hundreds of robots. Right? So their personal output will go from picking up an object and putting it onto a tray to essentially picking up a 100 objects and putting it onto a 100 trays. And the trade off we're making there is that we're increasing the consumption of energy. Now you could still say, okay. Speaker 259:36 - 59:54
相应地,那个人将能够协调数百台机器人。对吧?所以,他个人的产出将从“拿起一个物体并把它放到一个托盘上”,变成实质上“拿起 100 个物体并把它们放到 100 个托盘上”。而我们在这里做出的权衡是:我们提高了能源消耗。现在你仍然可以说,好吧。
Speaker 2 | 59:54 - 1:00:04 But you are consuming physical inputs. What's interesting about that, though, is let's dig into that. Alright? So there were some physical inputs and some machines that went into that factory. Well, where did those come from?
Speaker 2 | 59:54 - 1:00:04 但你还是在消耗实体投入。不过这里有意思的地方在于,我们来深挖一下。好吗?所以,确实有一些实体投入和一些机器进入了那家工厂。可它们又是从哪里来的呢?
Speaker 2 | 1:00:04 - 1:00:10 Right? Those don't grow on trees. Those also came from factories. And you can ask the same question. What went into that factory?
Speaker 2 | 1:00:04 - 1:00:10 对吧?它们又不是长在树上的。它们也同样来自工厂。你可以问同样的问题:那家工厂里投入了什么?
Speaker 2 | 1:00:10 - 1:00:19 It was energy. It was machines, and it was people. Right? Apply the same rubric, and you realize, okay. Actually, it's really just machines and energy.
Speaker 2 | 1:00:10 - 1:00:19 是能源,是机器,还有人。对吧?套用同样的分析框架,你就会意识到:好吧,实际上,归根结底真的就是机器和能源。
Speaker 2 | 1:00:19 - 1:00:38 Well, where did those machines come from? If you keep asking this question, what you realize is energy is the fundamental input. When we figure out AI and robotics that allows us to do semi autonomous manufacturing, energy will become the cost of all things. Right? The cost of buying a thing will become the cost of energy used to make it.
Speaker 2 | 1:00:19 - 1:00:38 嗯,这些机器是从哪里来的呢?如果你不断追问这个问题,你会意识到,energy(能源)才是最根本的输入。当我们搞清楚 AI 和 robotics(机器人技术),从而实现 semi autonomous manufacturing(半自主制造)时,energy 就会成为一切东西的成本。对吧?买一件东西的成本,将会变成制造它所消耗的 energy 成本。
Speaker 2 | 1:00:39 - 1:01:02 And to the extent that we can make energy 10 times cheaper and then 10 times cheaper, that is the extent to which we will be able to make basically everything free. And that's very exciting to me, because if we're going to go explore the stars and we're gonna set up, you know, a a place for us to live on Mars and explore the universe, we're gonna need a lot of stuff, and it's gonna be it's gonna need to be a lot cheaper than it is right now. So that's very exciting to me.
Speaker 2 | 1:00:39 - 1:01:02 而我们能把 energy 做到便宜 10 倍、再便宜 10 倍到什么程度,我们基本上就能把几乎所有东西变得免费到什么程度。这让我非常兴奋,因为如果我们要去探索星辰,要在 Mars 上建立一个让我们居住的地方,并探索宇宙,我们就会需要很多很多东西,而这些东西的成本必须比现在低得多。所以这让我非常兴奋。
Speaker 3 | 1:01:03 - 1:01:05 Exciting to me too. That's a great place to end. Thanks, Isaiah.
Speaker 3 | 1:01:03 - 1:01:05 我也很兴奋。这是个很好的结束点。谢谢你,Isaiah。
Speaker 2 | 1:01:05 - 1:01:06 Thanks so much for having me.
Speaker 2 | 1:01:05 - 1:01:06 非常感谢你们邀请我。
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